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Abstract
This paper aims at assisting empirical researchers beneﬁt from recent advances in
causal inference. The paper stresses the paradigmatic shifts that must be under-
taken in moving from traditional statistical analysis to causal analysis of multivari-
ate data. Special emphasis is placed on the assumptions that underly all causal in-
ferences, the languages used in formulating those assumptions, and the conditional
nature of causal claims inferred from nonexperimental studies. These emphases
are illustrated through a brief survey of recent results, including the control of
confounding, the assessment of causal eﬀects, the interpretation of counterfactuals,
and a symbiosis between counterfactual and graphical methods of analysis.
Key Words: Structural equation models, confounding, noncompliance, graphical
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1 Introduction
Almost two decades have passed since Paul Holland published his seminal
paper, Holland (1986), by the same title. Our understanding of causal
inference has since increased several folds, due primarily to advances in
three areas:
1. Nonparametric structural equations.
2. Graphical models.
3. Symbiosis between counterfactual and graphical methods.
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This paper aims at summarizing and exemplifying these advances.
These advances are central to the empirical sciences because the re-
search questions that motivate most studies in the health, social and be-
havioral sciences are not statistical but causal in nature. For example, what
is the eﬃcacy of a given drug in a given population? Whether data can
prove an employer guilty of hiring discrimination? What fraction of past
crimes could have been avoided by a given policy? What was the cause
of death of a given individual, in a speciﬁc incident? Not surprisingly,
the central target of such studies is the elucidation of cause-eﬀect rela-
tionships among variables of interests, for example, treatments, policies,
preconditions and outcomes. While good statisticians have always known
that the elucidation of causal relationships from observational studies must
be shaped by assumptions about how the data were generated, the relative
roles of assumptions and data has been a subject of numerous controver-
sies. This paper settles these controversies by introducing useful language
for formulating such assumptions and tools for analyzing empirical data in
light of these assumptions.
In order to express causal assumptions mathematically, certain exten-
sions are required in the standard mathematical language of Statistics, and
these extensions are not generally emphasized in the mainstream literature
and education. As a result, large segments of the statistical research com-
munity ﬁnd it hard to appreciate and beneﬁt from the many theoretical
results that causal analysis has produced in the past two decades. These
include advances in graphical models (Pearl, 1988; Lauritzen, 1996; Cowell
et al., 1999), counterfactual or “potential outcome” analysis (Rosenbaum
and Rubin, 1983; Robins, 1986; Manski, 1995; Angrist et al., 1996; Green-
land et al., 1999b), structural equation models Heckman and Smith (1998),
and a more recent formulation, which uniﬁes these approaches under a
single interpretation (Pearl, 1995a, 2000).
This paper aims at making these advances more accessible to the gen-
eral research community1. To this end, Section 2 begins by illuminat-
ing two conceptual barriers that impede the transition from statistical to
causal analysis: (i) coping with untested assumptions and (ii) acquiring
new mathematical notation. Crossing these barriers, Section 3.1 then in-
troduces the fundamentals of causal modeling from a perspective that is
1Excellent introductory expositions can also be found in Kaufman and Kaufman
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relatively new to the statistical literature. It is based on structural equa-
tion models (SEM), which have been used extensively in economics and
the social sciences (Goldberger, 1972; Duncan, 1975; Joreskog and Sorbom,
1978), even though the causal content of these models has been obscured
signiﬁcantly since their inception (Muthen, 1987; Chou and Bentler, 1995)
(see Freedman, 1987, for critique and Pearl, 2000, Chapter 5 for histori-
cal perspective). Section 3.2 uses these modeling fundamentals to develop
simple mathematical tools for estimating causal eﬀects and for the control
of confounding. These tools permit investigators to communicate causal
assumptions formally using diagrams, then inspect the diagram and
1. Decide whether the assumptions made are suﬃcient for obtaining
consistent estimates of the target quantity;
2. Derive (if the answer to item 1 is aﬃrmative) a closed-form expression
for the target quantity in terms of distributions of observed quantities;
and
3. Suggest (if the answer to item 1 is negative) a set of observations and
experiments that, if performed, would render a consistent estimate
feasible.
Section 4 relates these tools to procedures that are used in the potential
outcome approach. Finally, Section 4.3, oﬀers a symbiosis that exploits
the best features of the two approaches—structural models and potential
outcome.
2 From associational to causal analysis: Distinctions and
barriers
2.1 The basic distinction: coping with change
The aim of standard statistical analysis, typiﬁed by regression and other
estimation techniques, is to infer parameters of a distribution from samples
drawn of that distribution. With the help of such parameters, one can in-
fer associations among variables, estimate the likelihood of past and future
events, as well as update the likelihood of events in light of new evidence
or new measurements. These tasks are managed well by standard statis-
tical analysis so long as experimental conditions remain the same. Causal104 J. Pearl
analysis goes one step further; its aim is to infer aspects of the data gen-
eration process. With the help of such aspects, one can deduce not only
the likelihood of events under static conditions, but also the dynamics of
events under changing conditions. This capability includes predicting the
eﬀects of interventions (e.g., treatments or policy decisions) and sponta-
neous changes (e.g., epidemics or natural disasters), identifying causes of
reported events, and assessing responsibility and attribution (e.g., whether
event x was necessary (or suﬃcient) for the occurrence of event y).
This distinction implies that causal and associational concepts do not
mix. Associations characterize static conditions, while causal analysis deals
with changing conditions. There is nothing in the joint distribution of
symptoms and diseases to tell us that curing the former would or would not
cure the latter. More generally, there is nothing in a distribution function
to tell us how that distribution would diﬀer if external conditions were to
change—say from observational to experimental setup—because the laws of
probability theory do not dictate how one property of a distribution ought
to change when another property is modiﬁed2.
Drawing analogy to visual perception, the information contained in a
probability function is analogous to a geometrical description of a three-
dimensional object; it is suﬃcient for predicting how that object will be
viewed from any angle outside the object, but it is insuﬃcient for predicting
how the object will be deformed if manipulated and squeezed by external
forces. The additional information needed for making such predictions (e.g.,
the object’s resilience or elasticity) is analogous to the information that
causal assumptions provide in various forms—graphs, structural equations
or plain English. The role of this information is to identify those aspects of
the world that remain invariant when external conditions change, say due
to treatments or policy decisions.
These considerations imply that the slogan “correlation does not imply
causation” can be translated into a useful principle: one cannot substantiate
causal claims from associations alone, even at the population level—behind
every causal conclusion there must lie some causal assumption that is not
testable in observational studies. Cartwright (1989) expressed this principle
2Even the theory of stochastic processes, which provides probabilistic characterization
of certain dynamic phenomena, assumes a ﬁxed density function over time-indexed vari-
ables. There is nothing in such a function to tell us how it would be altered if external
conditions were to change; for example, restricting a variable to a certain value, or forcing
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as “no causes in, no causes out”, meaning we cannot convert statistical
knowledge into causal knowledge.
2.2 Formulating the basic distinction
A useful demarcation line that makes the distinction between associational
and causal concepts unambiguous and easy to apply, can be formulated as
follows. An associational concept is any relationship that can be deﬁned in
terms of a joint distribution (be it personal or frequency-based) of observed
variables, and a causal concept is any relationship that cannot be deﬁned
from the distribution alone. Examples of associational concepts are: cor-
relation, regression, dependence, conditional independence, likelihood, col-
lapsibility, risk ratio, odd ratio, marginalization, conditionalization, “con-
trolling for,” and so on3. Examples of causal concepts are: randomization,
inﬂuence, eﬀect, confounding, “holding constant,” disturbance, spurious
correlation, instrumental variables, intervention, explanation, attribution,
and so on. The purpose of this demarcation line is not to exclude these
causal concepts from the province of statistical analysis4 but, rather, to
make it easy for investigators to trace the assumptions that are needed
for substantiating various types of scientiﬁc claims. Every claim invoking
causal concepts must be traced to some premises that invoke such concepts;
it cannot be derived or inferred from statistical associations alone.
2.3 Ramiﬁcations of the basic distinction
This principle has far reaching consequences that are not generally recog-
nized in the standard statistics literature. Many researchers, for example,
are convinced that confounding is solidly founded in standard, frequen-
tist statistics, and that it can be given an associational deﬁnition saying
(roughly): “U is a potential confounder for examining the eﬀect of treat-
ment X on outcome Y when both U and X and U and Y are not indepen-
dent.” That this deﬁnition and all its many variants must fail, is obvious
3The term ‘risk ratio’ and ‘risk factors’ have been used ambivalently in the literature;
some authors insist on a risk factor having causal inﬂuence on the outcome, and some
embrace factors that are merely associated with the outcome.
4Pearl (2000) termed this distinction “causal vs. statistical” to reﬂect the overwhelm-
ing emphasis on associational concepts in the statistical literature. The term “causal vs.
associational” is used here as an invitation for statisticians to correct past neglects.106 J. Pearl
from basic considerations:
1. Confounding deals with the discrepancy between an association mea-
sured in an observational study and an association that would prevail
under ideal experimental conditions.
2. Associations prevailing under experimental conditions are causal
quantities because they cannot be inferred from the joint distribu-
tion alone. Therefore, confounding is a causal concept; its deﬁnition
cannot be based on statistical associations alone, since these can be
derived from the joint distribution.
Indeed, one can construct simple examples showing that the associa-
tional criterion is neither necessary nor suﬃcient, that is, some confounders
may not be associated with X nor with Y and some non-confounders may
be associated with both X and Y (Pearl, 2000, pp. 185–186); see also Sec-
tion 3.15. This further implies that confounding bias cannot be detected or
corrected by statistical methods alone, not even by the most sophisticated
techniques that purport to “control for confounders”, such as stepwise se-
lection Kleinbaum et al. (1998) or collapsibility-based methods Grayson
(1987). One must make some assumptions regarding causal relationships
in the problem, in particular about how the potential “confounders” aﬀect
other covariates in the problem, before an adjustment can safely correct
for confounding bias. It follows that the rich epidemiological literature
on the control of confounding must be predicated upon some tacit causal
assumptions and, since causal vocabulary has generally been avoided in
much of that literature (e.g., Bishop, 1971; Whittemore, 1978; Grayson,
1987; Hauck et al., 1991; Becher, 1992)6 , major eﬀorts would be required to
assess the relevance of this impressive literature to the modern conception
of confounding as eﬀect bias Greenland et al. (1999b)7.
5Similar arguments apply to the concepts of “randomization” and “instrumental vari-
ables” which are commonly thought to have associational deﬁnitions. Our demarcation
line implies that they don’t, and this implication guides us toward explicating the causal
assumptions upon which these concepts are founded (see Section 3.4). Randomization,
for example, is based on the assumption that the outcome of a fair coin is not “causally
inﬂuenced” by any variable that can be measured on a macroscopic level.
6Notable exception is the analysis of Greenland and Robins (1986).
7Although the confounding literature has permitted one causal assumption to con-
taminate its vocabulary—that the adjusted confounder must not be “aﬀected by the
treatment”, Cox (1958)—this condition alone is insuﬃcient for determining which vari-
ables need be adjusted for (Pearl, 2000, pp. 182–9).Statistics and Causal Inference 107
Another ramiﬁcation of the sharp distinction between associational and
causal concepts is that any mathematical approach to causal analysis must
acquire new notation for expressing causal assumptions and causal claims.
The vocabulary of probability calculus, with its powerful operators of con-
ditionalization and marginalization, is insuﬃcient for expressing causal in-
formation. To illustrate, the syntax of probability calculus does not permit
us to express the simple fact that “symptoms do not cause diseases”, let
alone draw mathematical conclusions from such facts. All we can say is
that two events are dependent—meaning that if we ﬁnd one, we can expect
to encounter the other, but we cannot distinguish statistical dependence,
quantiﬁed by the conditional probability P(disease|symptom) from causal
dependence, for which we have no expression in standard probability cal-
culus8. Scientists seeking to express causal relationships must therefore
supplement the language of probability with a vocabulary for causality,
one in which the symbolic representation for the relation “symptoms cause
disease” is distinct from the symbolic representation of “symptoms are as-
sociated with disease.” Only after achieving such a distinction can we label
the former sentence “false,” and the latter “true”, so as to properly in-
corporate causal information in the design and interpretation of statistical
studies.
The preceding two requirements: (1) to commence causal analysis with
untested9, theoretically or judgmentally based assumptions, and (2) to ex-
tend the syntax of probability calculus, constitute, in my experience, the
two main obstacles to the acceptance of causal analysis among statisticians
and among professionals with traditional training in statistics. We shall
now explore in more detail the nature of these two barriers, and why they
have been so tough to cross.
2.4 The barrier of untested assumptions
There are three fundamental diﬀerences between associational and causal
assumptions. First, associational assumptions, even untested, are testable
in principle, given suﬃciently large sample and suﬃciently ﬁne measure-
8Attempts to deﬁne causal dependence by adding temporal information and condition-
ing on the entire past (e.g., Suppes, 1970) violate the statistical requirement of limiting
the analysis to “observed variables”, and encounter other insurmountable diﬃculties (see,
Eells, 1991; Pearl, 2001, pp. 249–257).
9By “untested” I mean untested using frequency data in nonexperimental studies.108 J. Pearl
ments. Causal assumptions, in contrast, cannot be veriﬁed even in prin-
ciple, unless one resorts to experimental control. This diﬀerence is espe-
cially accentuated in Bayesian analysis. Though the priors that Bayesians
commonly assign to statistical parameters are untested quantities, the sen-
sitivity to these priors tends to diminish with increasing sample size. In
contrast, sensitivity to priors of causal parameters, say those measuring
the eﬀect of smoking on lung cancer, remains non-zero regardless of sample
size.
Second, associational assumptions can be expressed in the familiar lan-
guage of probability calculus, and thus assume an aura of scholarship and
scientiﬁc respectability. Causal assumptions, as we have seen before, are
deprived of that honor, and thus become immediate suspect of informal,
anecdotal or metaphysical thinking. Again, this diﬀerence becomes illumi-
nated among Bayesians, who are accustomed to accepting untested, judg-
mental assumptions, and should therefore invite causal assumptions with
open arms—they don’t. A Bayesian is prepared to accept an expert’s judg-
ment, however esoteric and untestable, so long as the judgment is presented
as a probability expression. Bayesians turn apprehensive when that same
judgment is cast in plain causal English, as in “treatment does not change
gender.” A typical example can be seen in Lindley and Novick (1981) treat-
ment of confounding, in the context of Simpson’s paradox (see Pearl, 2000,
pp. 174–182 for details).
The third resistance to causal (vis-` a-vis associational) assumptions
stems from their intimidating clarity. Assumptions about abstract proper-
ties of density functions or about conditional independencies among vari-
ables are, cognitively speaking, rather opaque, hence they tend to be for-
given, rather than debated. In contrast, assumptions about how variables
cause one another are shockingly transparent, and tend therefore to invite
counter-arguments and counter-hypotheses. Ironically, it is the latter fea-
ture that often deters researchers from articulating assumptions in causal
vocabulary. Indeed, since the bulk of scientiﬁc knowledge is organized in
causal schema, scientists are incredibly creative in constructing competing
alternatives to any causal hypothesis, however plausible. Statistical hy-
potheses in contrast, having been several levels removed from our store of
knowledge, are relatively protected from such challenges, and oﬀer therefore
a safer ride toward the conclusion.
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deal with defending modeling assumptions, in much the same way that
diﬀerential calculus does not deal with defending the physical validity of
a diﬀerential equation that a physicist chooses to use. In fact no analysis
void of experimental data can possibly defend causal assumptions. Instead,
causal analysis deals with the conclusions that logically follow from the
combination of data and a given set of assumptions, just in case one is
prepared to accept the latter. Thus, all causal inferences are necessarily
conditional, and the most one can demand from such analysis is:
1. That the premises be amenable to mathematical analysis.
2. That the premises be articulated in a meaningful and unambiguous
language for one to judge their plausibility or inevitability.
The structural equation language introduced in Section 3 will be shown
to have these two features.
2.5 The barrier of new notation
The need to adopt a new notation, foreign to the province of probability
theory, has been traumatic to most persons trained in statistics; partly be-
cause the adaptation of a new language is diﬃcult in general, and partly
because statisticians—this author included—have been accustomed to as-
suming that all phenomena, processes, thoughts, and modes of inference
can be captured in the powerful language of probability theory.
How does one recognize causal expressions in the statistical literature?
Those versed in the potential-outcome notation (Neyman, 1923; Rubin,
1974; Holland, 1988), can recognize such expressions through the subscripts
that are attached to counterfactual events and counterfactual variables, e.g.
Yx(u) or Zxy. (Some authors use parenthetical expressions, e.g. Y (x,u) or
Z(x,y).) The expression Yx(u), for example, stands for the value that
outcome Y would take in individual u, had treatment X been at level x.
If u is chosen at random, Yx is a random variable, and one can talk about
the probability that Yx would attain a value y in the population, written
P(Yx = y). Alternatively, Pearl (1995a) and Kaufman and Kaufman (2001)
used expressions of the form P(Y = y|set(X = x)) or P(Y = y|do(X = x))
to denote the probability (or frequency) that event (Y = y) would occur if110 J. Pearl
treatment condition X = x were enforced uniformly over the population10 .
Still a third notation that distinguishes causal expressions is provided by
graphical models, where the arrows convey causal directionality11 .
However, in the bulk of the statistical literature, causal claims rarely
appear in the mathematics. They surface only in the verbal interpretation
that investigators occasionally attach to certain associations, and in the ver-
bal description with which investigators justify assumptions. For example,
the assumption that a covariate is not aﬀected by a treatment, a necessary
assumption for the control of confounding Cox (1958), is expressed in plain
English, not in a mathematical expression.
The absence of notational distinction between causal and statistical
relationships at ﬁrst seemed harmless, because investigators were able to
keep such distinctions implicitly in their heads, and managed to conﬁne the
mathematics to conventional, conditional probability expressions (Breslow
and Day, 1980; Miettinen and Cook, 1981). However, as problem com-
plexity grew, the notational inadequacy of probability calculus began to
surface, and intense controversies ensued in the 1980-90’s between writers
using conventional statistical notation and the few who endeavored to en-
rich probability calculus with causal vocabulary. Robins (1986, 1987), for
example, showed that conventional methods of estimating survival distribu-
tions under time-dependent treatments, (e.g., time-dependent Cox regres-
sion) may be biased. Greenland and Robins (1986) showed (using counter-
factual analysis) that conventional deﬁnitions that equated confounding to
noncollapsibility would generally lead to biased eﬀect estimates. Holland
and Rubin (1988) came to similar conclusions. Using diagrams for guid-
ance, Weinberg (1993) noted that epidemiologists who follow established
practices and informal criteria often adjust for the wrong set of covariates.
Likewise, Robins and Greenland (1992) proved that the then prevailing
practice of estimating direct eﬀects by controlling intermediate variables
can lead to biased estimates. Again, using counterfactual notation, Robins
and Greenland (1989); Greenland (1999) showed that conventional crite-
10Clearly, P(Y = y|do(X = x)) is equivalent to P(Yx = y), which is what we normally
assess in a controlled experiment, with X randomized, in which the distribution of Y is
estimated for each level x of X.
11These notational clues should be useful for detecting inadequate deﬁnitions of causal
concepts; any deﬁnition of confounding, randomization or instrumental variables that
is cast in standard probability expressions, void of graphs, counterfactual subscripts or
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ria for deciding legal responsibility (for exposure-induced damages), which
were based on risk ratio instead of probability of causation, can be severely
biased relative to judicial standards. Thus, the notational inadequacy of
standard statistics, which was ﬁrst tolerated and glossed over, took a heavy
toll before explicit causal notation brought it to light.
Remarkably, despite this record of success, the mathematics of causal
analysis has remained enigmatic to most rank and ﬁle researchers, and its
potentials still lay grossly underutilized in the statistics based sciences. The
reason for this, I am ﬁrmly convinced, can be traced to the unfriendly and
ad-hoc notation in which causal analysis has been presented to the research
community. The next section provides a conceptualization that overcomes
these mental barriers; it oﬀers both a friendly mathematical machinery for
cause-eﬀect analysis and a formal foundation for counterfactual analysis.
3 The language of diagrams and structural equations
3.1 Linear structural equation models
How can one express mathematically the common understanding that
symptoms do not cause diseases? The earliest attempt to formulate such re-
lationship mathematically was made in the 1920’s by the geneticist Wright
(1921). Wright used a combination of equations and graphs to communi-
cate causal relationships. For example, if X stands for a disease variable
and Y stands for a certain symptom of the disease, Wright would write a
linear equation12 :
y = βx + u, (3.1)
where x stand for the level (or severity) of the disease, y stands for the
level (or severity) of the symptom, and u stands for all factors, other than
the disease in question, that could possibly aﬀect Y . In interpreting this
equation one should think of a physical process whereby Nature examines
the values of x and u and, accordingly, assigns to variable Y the value
y = βx + u.
Equation (3.1) still does not properly express the causal relationship
12Linear relations are used here for illustration purposes only; they do not represent
typical disease-symptom relations but illustrate the historical development of path analy-
sis. Additionally, we will use standardized variables, that is, zero mean and unit variance.112 J. Pearl
implied by this assignment process, because equations are symmetrical ob-
jects; if we re-write (3.1) as
x = (y − u)/β, (3.2)
it might be misinterpreted to mean that the symptom inﬂuences the dis-
ease, against the understanding that no such inﬂuence exists. To prevent
such misinterpretations, Wright augmented the equation with a diagram,
later called “path diagram”, in which arrows are drawn from (perceived)
causes to their (perceived) eﬀects, and the absence of an arrow encodes
the absence of direct causal inﬂuence between the corresponding variables.
Thus, in our example, the complete model of a symptom and a disease
would be written as in Figure 1: The diagram encodes the possible ex-
istence of (direct) causal inﬂuence of X on Y , and the absence of causal
inﬂuence of Y on X, while the equations encode the quantitative relation-
ships among the variables involved, to be determined from the data. The
parameter β in the equation is called a “path coeﬃcient” and it quantiﬁes
the (direct) causal eﬀect of X on Y ; given the numerical value of β, the
equation claims that a unit increase in X would result in β units increase
of Y . The variables V and U are called “exogenous”; they represent ob-
served or unobserved background factors that the modeler decides to keep
unexplained, that is, factors that inﬂuence but are not inﬂuenced by the
other variables (called “endogenous”) in the model. Unobserved exogenous
variables are sometimes called “disturbances” or “errors”, they represent
factors omitted from the model but judged to be relevant for explaining
the behavior of variables in the model. Variable V , for example, represents
factors that contribute to the disease X, which may or may not be corre-
lated with U (the factors that inﬂuence the symptom Y ). If correlation is
presumed possible, it is customary to connect the two variables, U and V ,
by a dashed double arrow, as shown in Figure 1(b).
In reading path diagrams, it is common to use kinship relations such
as parent, child, ancestor, and descendent, the interpretation of which is
usually self evident. For example, an arrow X → Y designates X as a
parent of Y and Y as a child of X. By convention, only observed variables
qualify as “parents”, thus, in Figure 1(a), only X qualiﬁes as a parent of
Y , since U is unobserved (as indicated by the dashed arrow). Likewise, the
ancestors (respectively, descendants) of a given node, Y , are those variables
that can be traced from Y going against (respectively, along) the solid
arrows in the diagram. A “path” is any consecutive sequence of edges,Statistics and Causal Inference 113
V U V U
β X Y β X Y
(b) (a)
x = v
y =   x + u β
Figure 1: A simple structural equation model, and its associated diagrams. Un-
observed exogenous variables are connected by dashed arrows.
solid or dashed. For example, there are two paths between X and Y in
Figure 1(b), one consisting of the direct arrow X → Y while the other
tracing the nodes X,V,U and Y .
Wright’s major contribution to causal analysis, aside from introducing
the language of path diagrams, has been the development of graphical rules
for writing down the covariance of any pair of observed variables in terms
of path coeﬃcients and of covariances among the error terms. In our simple
example, one can immediately write the relations
Cov(X,Y ) = β (3.3)
for Figure 1(a), and
Cov(X,Y ) = β + Cov(U,V ) (3.4)
for Figure 1(b) (these can be derived of course from the equations, but,
for large models, algebraic methods tend to obscure the origin of the de-
rived quantities). Under certain conditions, (e.g. if Cov(U,V ) = 0), such
relationships may allow one to solve for the path coeﬃcients in term of
observed covariance terms only, and this amounts to inferring the magni-
tude of (direct) causal eﬀects from observed, nonexperimental associations,
assuming of course that one is prepared to defend the causal assumptions
encoded in the diagram.
It is important to note that, in path diagrams, causal assumptions are
encoded not in the links but, rather, in the missing links. An arrow merely
indicates the possibility of causal connection, the strength of which remains
to be determined (from data); a missing arrow makes a deﬁnite commitment
to a zero-strength connection. In Figure 1(a), for example, the assumptions114 J. Pearl
(a) (b)
W
Z
V
X
U
Y
0 x
U
Y
W
Z
V
X
Figure 2: (a) The diagram associated with the structural model of Equation (3.5).
(b) The diagram associated with the modiﬁed model of Equation (3.6), represent-
ing the intervention do(X = x0).
that permits us to identify the direct eﬀect β is encoded by the missing
double arrow between V and U, indicating Cov(U,V )=0, together with
the missing arrow from Y to X. Had any of these two links been added to
the diagram, we would not have been able to identify the direct eﬀect β.
Such additions would amount to relaxing the assumption Cov(U,V ) = 0, or
the assumption that Y does not eﬀect X, respectively. Note also that both
assumptions are causal, not associational, since none can be determined
from the joint density of the observed variables, X and Y ; the association
between the unobserved terms, U and V , can only be uncovered in an
experimental setting; or (in more intricate models, as in Figure 5) from
other causal assumptions.
Although each causal assumption in isolation cannot be tested, the sum
total of all causal assumptions in a model often has testable implications.
The chain model of Figure 2(a), for example, encodes seven causal assump-
tions, each corresponding to a missing arrow or a missing double-arrow
between a pair of variables. None of those assumptions is testable in isola-
tion, yet the totality of all those assumptions implies that Z is unassociated
with Y in every stratum of X. Such testable implications can be read oﬀ
the diagrams using a graphical criterion known as d-separation (see Pearl,
2000, pp. 16–19), and these constitute the only opening through which
the assumptions embodied in structural equation models can confront the
scrutiny of nonexperimental data. In other words, every conceivable statis-
tical test capable of invalidating the model is entailed by those implications.Statistics and Causal Inference 115
3.2 From linear to nonparametric models
Structural equation modeling (SEM) has been the main vehicle for eﬀect
analysis in Economics and the Behavioral and Social Sciences (Goldberger,
1972; Duncan, 1975; Bollen, 1989). However, the bulk of SEM method-
ology was developed for linear analysis and, until recently, no comparable
methodology has been devised to extend its capabilities to models involving
dichotomous variables or nonlinear dependencies. A central requirement for
any such extension is to detach the notion of “eﬀect” from its algebraic rep-
resentation as a coeﬃcient in an equation, and redeﬁne “eﬀect” as a general
capacity to transmit changes among variables. Such an extension, based
on simulating hypothetical interventions in the model, is presented in Pearl
(1995a, 2000) and has led to new ways of deﬁning and estimating causal
eﬀects in nonlinear and nonparametric models (that is, models in which
the functional form of the equations is unknown).
The central idea is to exploit the invariant characteristics of structural
equations without committing to a speciﬁc functional form. For example,
the non-parametric interpretation of the diagram of Figure 2(a) corresponds
to a set of three functions, each corresponding to one of observed variables:
z = fZ(w)
x = fX(z,v) (3.5)
y = fY (x,u),
where W,V and U are assumed to be jointly independent but, otherwise,
arbitrarily distributed. Each of these functions represents a causal process
(or mechanism) that determines the value of the left variable (output) from
those on the right variables (inputs). The absence of a variable on the right
of an equations encodes the assumption that it has no direct eﬀect on the
left variable. For example, the absence of variable Z from the arguments
of fY indicates that variations in Z will leave Y unchanged, as long as
variables U, and X remain constant. A system of such functions are said to
be structural if they are assumed to be autonomous, that is, each function
is invariant to possible changes in the form of the other functions (Simon,
1953; Holland, 1953).116 J. Pearl
Representing interventions
This feature of invariance permits us to use structural equations as a basis
for modeling causal eﬀects and counterfactuals. This is done through a
mathematical operator called do(x) which simulates physical interventions
by deleting certain functions from the model, replacing them by a constant
X = x, while keeping the rest of the model unchanged. For example,
to emulate an intervention do(x0) that holds X constant (at X = x0) in
model M of Figure 2(a), we replace the equation for x in Equation (3.5)
with x = x0, and obtain a new model, Mx0,
z = fZ(w)
x = x0 (3.6)
y = fY (x,u),
the graphical description of which is shown in Figure 2(b).
The joint distribution associated with the modiﬁed model, denoted
P(z,y|do(x0)) describes the post-intervention distribution of variables Y
and Z (also called “controlled” or “experimental” distribution), to be
distinguished from the pre-intervention distribution, P(x,y,z), associated
with the original model of Equation (3.5). For example, if X represents a
treatment variable, Y a response variable, and Z some covariate that aﬀects
the amount of of treatment received, then the distribution P(z,y|do(x0))
gives the proportion of individuals that would attain response level Y = y
and covariate level Z = z under the hypothetical treatment X = x0 that is
administered uniformly to the population.
From this distribution, one is able to assess treatment eﬃcacy by com-
paring aspects of this distribution at diﬀerent levels of x0. A common
measure of treatment eﬃcacy is the average diﬀerence
E(Y |do(x0
0)) − E(Y |do(x0)), (3.7)
where x0
0 and x0 are two levels (or types) of treatment selected for compar-
ison. Another measure is the ratio
E(Y |do(x0
0))/E(Y |do(x0)). (3.8)
The variance V ar(Y |do(x0)), or any other distributional parameter, can
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the controlled distribution function P(Y = y|do(x)) =
P
z P(z,y|do(x))
which was called “causal eﬀect” in Pearl (2000, 1995a) (see footnote
10). The central question in the analysis of causal eﬀects is the ques-
tion of identiﬁcation: Can the controlled (post-intervention) distribution,
P(Y = y|do(x)), be estimated from data governed by the pre-intervention
distribution, P(z,x,y)? This is the problem of identiﬁcation which has
received considerable attention by causal analysts.
A fundamental theorem in causal analysis states that such identiﬁcation
would be feasible whenever the model is Markovian, that is, the graph is
acyclic (i.e., containing no directed cycles) and all the error terms are jointly
independent. Non-Markovian models, such as those involving correlated
errors (resulting from unmeasured confounders), permit identiﬁcation only
under certain conditions, and these conditions can be determined from the
graph structure using the following basic theorem.
Theorem 3.1 (The Causal Markov Condition). Any distribution gen-
erated by a Markovian model M can be factorized as
P(v1,v2,...,vn) =
Y
i
P(vi|pai), (3.9)
where V1,V2,...,Vn are the endogenous variables in M, and pai are (values
of) the endogenous parents of Vi in the causal diagram associated with M.
For example, the distribution associated with the model in Figure 2(a)
can be factorized as
P(z,y,x) = P(z)P(x|z)P(y|x), (3.10)
since X is the (endogenous) parent of Y,Z is the parent of X, and Z has
no parents.
Corollary 3.1 (Truncated factorization). For any Markovian model,
the distribution generated by an intervention do(X = x0) on a set X of
endogenous variables is given by the truncated factorization
P(v1,v2,...,vk|do(x0)) =
Y
i|Vi6∈X
P(vi|pai)|x=x0 , (3.11)118 J. Pearl
where P(vi|pai) are the pre-intervention conditional probabilities13 .
Corollary 3.1 instructs us to remove from the product of Equation
(3.9) all factors associated with the intervened variables (members of set
X). This follows from the fact that the post-intervention model is Marko-
vian as well, hence, following Theorem 3.1, it must generate a distribution
that is factorized according to the modiﬁed graph, yielding the truncated
product of Corollary 3.1. In our example of Figure 2(b), the distribution
P(z,y|do(x0)) associated with the modiﬁed model is given by
P(z,y|do(x0)) = P(z)P(y|x0),
where P(z) and P(y|x0) are identical to those associated with the pre-
intervention distribution of Equation (3.10). As expected, the distribution
of Z is not aﬀected by
the intervention, since
P(z|do(x0)) =
X
y
P(z,y|do(x0)) = P(z)
X
y
P(y|do(x0)) = P(z),
while that of Y is sensitive to x0, and is given by
P(y|do(x0)) = P(y|x0).
This example demonstrates how the (causal) assumptions embedded in
the model M permit us to predict the post-intervention distribution from
the pre-intervention distribution, which further permits us to estimate the
causal eﬀect of X on Y from nonexperimental data, since P(y|x0) is es-
timable from such data. Note that we have made no assumption whatso-
ever on the form of the equations or the distribution of the error terms; it is
the structure of the graph alone that permits the derivation to go through.
Deriving causal eﬀects
The truncated factorization formula enables us to derive causal quanti-
ties directly, without dealing with equations or equation modiﬁcation as
13A simple proof of the Causal Markov Theorem is given in Pearl (2000, p. 30). This
theorem was ﬁrst stated in Pearl and Verma (1991), but it is implicit in the works of
Kiiveri et al. (1984) and others. Corollary 3.1 was named “Manipulation Theorem” in
Spirtes et al. (1993), and is also implicit in Robins (1987) G-computation formula. See
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Figure 3: Markovian model illustrating the derivation of the causal eﬀect of X on
Y , Equation (3.14). Error terms are not shown explicitly.
in Equation (3.6). Consider, for example, the model shown in Figure 3,in
which the error variables are kept implicit. Instead of writing down the cor-
responding ﬁve nonparametric equations, we can write the join distribution
directly as
P(x,z1,z2,z3,y) = P(z1)P(z2)P(z3|z1,z2)P(x|z1,z3)P(y|z2,z3,x), (3.12)
where each marginal or conditional probability on the right hand side is
directly estimatable from the data. Now suppose we intervene and set
variable X to x0. The post-intervention distribution can readily be written
(using the truncated factorization formula) as
P(z1,z2,z3,y|do(x0)) = P(z1)P(z2)P(z3|z1,z2)P(y|z2,z3,x0), (3.13)
and the causal eﬀect of X on Y can be obtained immediately by marginal-
izing over the Z variables, giving
P(y|do(x0)) =
X
z1,z2,z3
P(z1)P(z2)P(z3|z1,z2)P(y|z2,z3,x0). (3.14)
Note that this formula corresponds precisely to what is commonly called
“adjusting for Z1,Z2 and Z3” and, moreover, we can write down this for-
mula by inspection, without thinking on whether Z1,Z2 and Z3 are con-
founders, whether they lie on the causal pathways, and so on. Though such
questions can be answered explicitly from the topology of the graph, they
are dealt with automatically when we write down the truncated factoriza-
tion formula and marginalize.
Note also that the truncated factorization formula is not restricted to
interventions on a single variable; it is applicable to simultaneous or se-
quential interventions such as those invoked in the analysis of time varying120 J. Pearl
treatment with time varying confounders Robins (1986). For example, if
X and Z2 are both treatment variables, and Z1 and Z3 are measured co-
variates, then the post-intervention distribution would be
P(z1,z3,y|do(x),do(z2)) = P(z1)P(z3|z1,z2)P(y|z2,z3,x), (3.15)
and the causal eﬀect of the treatment sequence do(X = x),do(Z2 = z2)14
would be
P(y|do(x),do(z2)) =
X
z1,z3
P(z1)P(z3|z1,z2)P(y|z2,z3,x). (3.16)
This expression coincides with Robins (1987) G-computation formula,
which was derived from a more complicated set of (counterfactual) assump-
tions. As noted by Robins, the formula dictates an adjustment for covari-
ates (e.g., Z3) that might be aﬀected by previous treatments (e.g., Z2).
Coping with unmeasured confounders
Things are more complicated when we face unmeasured confounders. For
example, it is not immediately clear whether the formula in Equation (3.14)
can be estimated if any of Z1,Z2 and Z3 is not measured. A few algebraic
steps would reveal that one can perform the summation over Z1 (since Z1
and Z2 are independent) to obtain
P(y|do(x0)) =
X
z2,z3
P(z2)P(z3|z2)P(y|z2,z3,x0), (3.17)
which means that we need only adjust for Z2 and Z3 without ever observing
Z1. But it is not immediately clear that no algebraic manipulation can fur-
ther reduce the resulting expression, or that measurement of Z3 (unlike Z1,
or Z2) is necessary in any estimation of P(y|do(x0)). Such considerations
become transparent in the graphical representation, to be discussed next.
Selecting covariates for adjustment (the back-door criterion)
Consider an observational study where we wish to ﬁnd the eﬀect of X on Y ,
for example, treatment on response, and assume that the factors deemed
14For clarity, we drop the (superﬂuous) subscript 0 from x0 and z20.Statistics and Causal Inference 121
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Figure 4: Markovian model illustrating the back-door criterion. Error terms are
not shown explicitly.
relevant to the problem are structured as in Figure 4; some are aﬀecting
the response, some are aﬀecting the treatment and some are aﬀecting both
treatment and response. Some of these factors may be unmeasurable, such
as genetic trait or life style, others are measurable, such as gender, age, and
salary level. Our problem is to select a subset of these factors for measure-
ment and adjustment, namely, that if we compare treated vs. untreated
subjects having the same values of the selected factors, we get the correct
treatment eﬀect in that subpopulation of subjects. Such a set of factors is
called a “suﬃcient set” or a set “appropriate for adjustment”.
The following criterion, named “back-door” in Pearl (1993), provides a
graphical method of selecting such a set of factors for adjustment. It states
that a set S is appropriate for adjustment if two conditions hold:
1. No element of S is a descendant of X.
2. The elements of S “block” all “back-door” paths from X to Y , namely
all paths that end with an arrow pointing to X.
In this criterion, a set S of nodes is said to block a path p if either (i)
p contains at least one arrow-emitting node that is in S, or (ii) p contains
at least one collision node that is outside S and has no descendant in S15 .
For example, the set S = {Z3} blocks the path X ← W1 ← Z1 → Z3 → Y ,
because the arrow-emitting node Z3 is in S. However, the set S = {Z3}
does not block the path X ← W1 ← Z1 → Z3 ← Z2 → W2 → Y , because
15The terms “arrow-emitting node” and “collision node” are to be interpreted literally
as illustrated by the examples given.122 J. Pearl
none of the arrow-emitting nodes, Z1 and Z2, is in S, and the collision node
Z3 is not outside S.
Based on this criterion we see, for example, that the sets {Z1,Z2,Z3},
{Z1,Z3}, and {W2,Z3}, each is suﬃcient for adjustment, because each
blocks all back-door paths between X and Y . The set {Z3}, however, is
not suﬃcient for adjustment because, as explained above, it does not block
the path X ← W1 ← Z1 → Z3 ← Z2 → W2 → Y .
The intuition behind the back-door criterion is as follows. The back-
door paths in the diagram carry spurious associations from X to Y , while
the paths directed along the arrows from X to Y carry causative asso-
ciations. Blocking the former paths (by conditioning on S) ensures that
the measured association between X and Y is purely causative, namely, it
correctly represents the target quantity: the causal eﬀect of X on Y .
Formally, the implication of ﬁnding a suﬃcient set S is that, stratifying
on S is guaranteed to remove all confounding bias relative the causal eﬀect
of X on Y . In other words, the risk diﬀerence in each stratum of S gives
the correct causal eﬀect in that stratum. In the binary case, for example,
the risk diﬀerence in stratum s of S is given by
P(Y = 1|X = 1,S = s) − P(Y = 1|X = 0,S = s),
while the causal eﬀect (of X on Y ) at that stratum is given by
P(Y = 1|do(X = 1),S = s) − P(Y = 1|do(X = 0),S = s).
These two expressions are guaranteed to be equal whenever S is a suf-
ﬁcient set, such as {Z1,Z3} or {Z2,Z3} in Figure 4. Likewise, the average
stratiﬁed risk diﬀerence, taken over all strata,
X
s
[P(Y = 1|X = 1,S = s) − P(Y = 1|X = 0,S = s)]P(S = s),
gives the correct causal eﬀect of X on Y in the entire population
P(Y = 1|do(X = 1)) − P(Y = 1|do(X = 0)).
In general, for multivalued variables X and Y , ﬁnding a suﬃcient set S
permits us to write
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and
P(Y = y|do(X = x)) =
X
s
P(Y = y|X = x,S = s)P(S = s). (3.18)
Since all factors on the right hand side of the equation are estimable
(e.g., by regression) from the pre-interventional data, the causal eﬀect can
likewise be estimated from such data without bias.
Interestingly, it can be shown that any suﬃcient set, S, taken as a
unit, satisﬁes the associational criterion that epidemiologists have been
using to deﬁne “confounders”. In other words, S must be associated with
X and, simultaneously, associated with Y , given X. This need not hold
for any speciﬁc members of S. For example, the variable Z3 in Figure 4,
though it is a member of every suﬃcient set and hence a confounder, can
be unassociated with both Y and X (Pearl, 2000, p. 195).
The back-door criterion allows us to write Equation (3.18) directly, by
selecting a suﬃcient set S from the diagram, without manipulating the
truncated factorization formula. The selection criterion can be applied
systematically to diagrams of any size and shape, thus freeing analysts
from judging whether “X is conditionally ignorable given S”, a formidable
mental task required in the potential-response framework Rosenbaum and
Rubin (1983). The criterion also enables the analyst to search for an opti-
mal set of covariate—namely, a set S that minimizes measurement cost or
sampling variability (Tian et al., 1998).
General control of confounding
Adjusting for covariates is only one of many methods that permits us to
estimate causal eﬀects in nonexperimental studies. Pearl (1995a) has pre-
sented examples in which there exists no set of variables that is suﬃcient for
adjustment and where the causal eﬀect can nevertheless be estimated con-
sistently. The estimation, in such cases, employs multi-stage adjustments.
For example, if W3 is the only observed covariate in the model of Figure 4,
then there exists no suﬃcient set for adjustment (because no set of observed
covariates can block the paths from X to Y through Z3), yet P(y|do(x))
can be estimated in two steps; ﬁrst we estimate P(w3|do(x)) = P(w3|x)
(by virtue of the fact that there exists no back-door path from X to W3),
second we estimate P(y|do(w3)) (since X constitutes a suﬃcient set for the124 J. Pearl
eﬀect of W3 on Y ) and, ﬁnally, we combine the two eﬀects together and
obtain
P(y|do(x)) =
X
w3
P(w3|do(x))P(y|do(w3)). (3.19)
The analysis used in the derivation and validation of such results in-
vokes mathematical means of transforming causal quantities, represented
by expressions such as P(Y = y|do(x)), into do-free expressions deriv-
able from P(z,x,y), since only do-free expressions are estimable from non-
experimental data. When such a transformation is feasible, we are ensured
that the causal quantity is identiﬁable.
General graphical methods for the identiﬁcation and control of con-
founders, were presented in Galles and Pearl (1995), while extensions to
problems involving multiple interventions (e.g., time varying treatments)
were developed in Pearl and Robins (1995), Kuroki and Miyakawa (1999),
and (Pearl, 2000, Chapters 3 and 4).
A recent analysis, Tian and Pearl (2002), further shows that the key to
identiﬁability lies not in blocking paths between X and Y but, rather, in
blocking paths between X and its immediate successors on the pathways to
Y . All existing criteria for identiﬁcation are special cases of the one deﬁned
in the following theorem:
Theorem 3.2 (Tian and Pearl (2002)). A suﬃcient condition for iden-
tifying the causal eﬀect P(y|do(x)) is that every path between X and any of
its children traces at least one arrow emanating from a measured variable.16
3.3 Counterfactual analysis in structural models
Not all questions of causal character can be encoded in P(y|do(x)) type
expressions, in much the same way that not all causal questions can be
answered from experimental studies. For example, questions of attribution
(e.g., what fraction of death cases are due to speciﬁc exposure?) or of sus-
ceptibility (what fraction of some healthy unexposed population would have
gotten the disease had they been exposed?) cannot be answered from exper-
imental studies, and naturally, this kind of questions cannot be expressed
16Before applying this criterion, one may delete from the causal graph all nodes that
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in P(y|do(x)) notation17 . To answer such questions, a probabilistic analysis
of counterfactuals is required, one dedicated to the relation “Y would be
y had X been x in situation U = u,” denoted Yx(u) = y. Remarkably,
unknown to most economists and philosophers, structural equation mod-
els provide the formal interpretation and symbolic machinery for analyzing
such counterfactual relationships18 .
The key idea is to interpret the phrase “had X been x” as an instruction
to modify the original model and replace the equation for X by a constant x,
as we have done in Equation (3.6). This replacement permits the constant
x to diﬀer from the actual value of X (namely fX(z,v)) without rendering
the system of equations inconsistent, thus yielding a formal interpretation
of counterfactuals in multi-stage models, where the dependent variable in
one equation may be an independent variable in another.
To illustrate, consider again the modiﬁed model Mx0 of Equation (3.6),
formed by the intervention do(X = x0) (Figure 2(b)). Call the solution of Y
in model Mx0 the potential response of Y to x0, and denote it by the symbol
Yx0(u,v,w). This entity can be given a counterfactual interpretation, for
it stands for the way an individual with characteristics (u,v,w) would re-
spond, had the treatment been x0, rather than the treatment x = fX(z,v)
actually received by that individual. In our example, since Y does not
depend on v and w, we can write:
Yx0(u,v,w) = Yx0(u) = fY (x0,u).
Clearly, the distribution P(u,v,w) induces a well deﬁned probability on
the counterfactual event Yx0 = y, as well as on joint counterfactual events,
such as ‘Yx0 = y AND Yx1 = y0,’ which are, in principle, unobservable
if x0 6= x1. Thus, to answer attributional questions, such as whether Y
would be y1 if X were x1, given that in fact Y is y0 and X is x0, we
need to compute the conditional probability P(Yx1 = y1|Y = y0,X = x0)
17The reason for this fundamental limitation is that no death case can be tested twice,
with and without treatment. For example, if we measure equal proportions of deaths
in the treatment and control groups, we cannot tell how many death cases are actually
attributable to the treatment itself; it is quite possible that many of those who died under
treatment would be alive if untreated and, simultaneously, many of those who survived
with treatment would have died if not treated.
18Connections between structural equations and a restricted class of counterfactuals
were ﬁrst recognized by Simon and Rescher (1966). These were later generalized by Balke
and Pearl (1995) to permit counterfactual conditioning on dependent variables.126 J. Pearl
which is well deﬁned once we know the forms of the structural equations
and the distribution of the exogenous variables in the model. For example,
assuming a linear equation for Y (as in Figure 1),
y = βx + u,
the conditions Y = y0 and X = x0 yield V = x0 and U = y0 − βx0,
and we can conclude that, with probability one, Yx1 must take the value:
Yx1 = βx1+U = β(x1−x0)+y0. In other words, if X were x1 instead of x0,
Y would increase by β times the diﬀerence (x1−x0). In nonlinear systems,
the result would also depend on the distribution of U and, for that reason,
attributional queries are generally not identiﬁable in nonparametric models
(Pearl, 2000, Chapter 9).
This interpretation of counterfactuals, cast as solutions to modiﬁed sys-
tems of equations, provides the conceptual and formal link between struc-
tural equation modeling and the Neyman-Rubin potential-outcome frame-
work, as well as Robins’ extensions, which will be discussed in Section 4.
It ensures us that the end results of the two approaches will be the same;
the choice is strictly a matter of convenience or insight.
3.4 An example: Non-compliance in clinical trials
Formulating the assumptions
Consider the model of Figure 5(a) and Equation (3.5), and assume that
it represents the experimental setup in a typical clinical trial with partial
compliance. Let Z, X, Y be observed variables, where Z represents a ran-
domized treatment assignment, X is the treatment actually received, and
Y is the observed response. The U term represents all factors (unobserved)
that inﬂuence the way a subject responds to treatments; hence, an arrow
is drawn from U to Y . Similarly, V denotes all factors that inﬂuence the
subject’s compliance with the assignment, and W represents the random
device used in deciding assignment. The dependence between V and U
allows for certain factors (e.g., socio economic status or predisposition to
disease and complications) to inﬂuence both compliance and response. In
Equation (3.5), fX represents the process by which subjects select treat-
ment level and fY represents the process that determines the outcome Y .
Clearly, perfect compliance would amount to setting fX(z,v) = z while any
dependence on v represents imperfect compliance.Statistics and Causal Inference 127
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Figure 5: (a) Causal diagram representing a clinical trial with imperfect compli-
ance. (b) A diagram representing interventional treatment control.
The graphical model of Figure 5(a) reﬂects two assumptions.
1. The assignment Z does not inﬂuence Y directly but rather through
the actual treatment taken, X. This type of assumption is called
“exclusion” restriction, for it excludes a variable (Z) from being a
determining argument of the function fY .
2. The variable Z is independent of U and V ; this is ensured through
the randomization of Z, which rules out a common cause for both Z
and U (as well as for Z and V ).
By drawing the diagram of Figure 5(a) an investigator encodes an unam-
biguous speciﬁcation of these two assumptions, and permits the technical
part of the analysis to commence, under the interpretation provided by
Equation (3.5).
The target of causal analysis in this setting is to estimate the causal
eﬀect of the treatment (X) on the the outcome (Y ). This eﬀect is deﬁned
as the response of the population in hypothetical experiment in which we
administer treatment at level X = x0 uniformly to the entire population
and let x0 take diﬀerent values on hypothetical copies of the population.
Such hypothetical experiments is governed by the modiﬁed model of Equa-
tion (3.6) and the corresponding distribution P(y|do(x0)). An inspection
of the diagram in Figure 5(a) reveals immediately that this distribution
is not identiﬁable by adjusting for confounders. The graphical criterion
for such adjustment requires the existence of observed covariates on the
“back-door” path X ← V ↔ U → Y , so as to block (by stratiﬁcation) the
spurious associations created by that path. Had V (or U) been observable,128 J. Pearl
the treatment eﬀect would have been obtained by stratiﬁcation on the levels
of V
P(Y = y|do(x0)) =
X
v
P(Y = y|X = x0,V = v)P(V = v), (3.20)
thus yielding an estimable expression that requires no measurement of U
and no assumptions relative the dependence between U and V . However,
since V (and U) are assumed to be unobserved, and since no other blocking
covariates exist, the investigator can conclude that confounding bias cannot
be removed by adjustment. Moreover, it can be shown that, in the absence
of additional assumptions, the treatment eﬀect in such graphs cannot be
identiﬁed by any method whatsoever Balke and Pearl (1997); one must
therefore resort to approximate methods of assessment.
It is interesting to note that it is our insistence on allowing arbitrary
functions in Equation (3.5) that curtails our ability to infer the treatment
eﬀect from nonexperimental data (when V and U are unobserved). In linear
systems, for example, the causal eﬀect of X on Y is identiﬁable, as can be
seen by writing19 :
y = fY (x,u) = βx + u; (3.21)
multiplying this equation by z and taking expectations, gives
β = Cov(Z,Y )/(Cov(Z,X)), (3.22)
which reduces β to correlations among observed measurements. Equation
(3.22) is known as the instrumental variable estimand (Bowden and Turk-
ington, 1984).
Similarly, Imbens and Angrist (1994) have shown that certain nonlin-
ear restrictions of the functions fX and fY may render the causal eﬀect
identiﬁable.
Bounding causal eﬀects
When conditions for identiﬁcation are not met, the best one can do is derive
bounds for the quantities of interest—namely, a range of possible values that
19Note the β represents the incremental causal eﬀect of X on Y , deﬁned by
β
∆ = E(Y |do(x0 + 1)) − E(Y |do(x0)).
Naturally, all attempts to give β statistical interpretation have ended in frustration
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represents our ignorance about the data-generating process and that cannot
be improved with increasing sample size. In our example, this amounts to
bounding the average diﬀerence of Equation (3.7) subject to the constraint
provided by the observed distribution
P(x,y|z) =
X
v,u
P(x,y,v,u|z)
=
X
v,u
P(y|x,u,v)P(x|z,v)P(u,v), (3.23)
where the product decomposition is licensed by the conditional indepen-
dencies shown in Figure 5(a). Likewise, since the causal eﬀect is governed
by the modiﬁed model of Figure 5(b), it can be written
P(y|do(x0)) − P(y|do(x00)) =
X
u
[P(y|x0,u) − P(y|x00,u)]P(u). (3.24)
Our task is then to bound the expression in Equation (3.24) given
the observed probabilities P(y,x|z) as expressed in Equation (3.23). This
task amounts to a constrained optimization exercise of ﬁnding the highest
and lowest values of Equation (3.24) subject to the equality constraint in
Equation (3.23), where the maximization ranges over all possible functions
P(u,v), P(y|x,u,v) and P(x|z,u) that satisfy those constraints.
Using linear-programming techniques, Balke and Pearl (1997) have de-
rived closed-form solutions for these bounds20 and showed that despite the
imperfection of the experiments, the derived bounds can yield signiﬁcant
and sometimes accurate information on the treatment eﬃcacy. Chickering
and Pearl (1997) further used Bayesian techniques (with Gibbs sampling)
to investigate the sharpness of these bounds as a function of sample size.
Testable implications
The two assumptions embodied in the model of Figure 5(a), that Z is ran-
domized and has no direct eﬀect on Y , are untestable in general (Bonet,
2001). However, if the treatment variable may take only a ﬁnite number
of values, the combination of these two assumptions yields testable impli-
cations, and these can be used to alert investigators to possible violations
20Looser bounds were derived earlier by ? and ?130 J. Pearl
of these assumptions. The testable implications take the form of inequali-
ties which restrict aspects of the observed conditional distribution P(x,y|z)
from exceeding certain bounds Pearl (1995b).
One specially convenient form that these restrictions assume is given by
the inequality
max
x
X
y
[max
z P(x,y|z)] ≤ 1. (3.25)
Pearl (1995b) called this restriction an instrumental inequality, because
it constitutes a necessary condition for any variable Z to qualify as an
instrument relative to the pair (X,Y ). This inequality is sharp for binary
valued X, but becomes loose when the cardinality of X increases21 .
If all observed variables are binary, Equation (3.25) reduces to the four
inequalities
P(Y = 0,X = 0|Z = 0) + P(Y = 1,X = 0|Z = 1) ≤ 1
P(Y = 0,X = 1|Z = 0) + P(Y = 1,X = 1|Z = 1) ≤ 1
P(Y = 1,X = 0|Z = 0) + P(Y = 0,X = 0|Z = 1) ≤ 1
P(Y = 1,X = 1|Z = 0) + P(Y = 0,X = 1|Z = 1) ≤ 1. (3.26)
We see that the instrumental inequality is violated when the control-
ling instrument Z manages to produce signiﬁcant changes in the response
variable Y while the direct cause, X, remains constant.
The instrumental inequality can be used in the detection of undesirable
side-eﬀects. Violations of this inequality can be attributed to one of two
possibilities: either there is a direct causal eﬀect of the assignment (Z) on
the response (Y ), unmediated by the treatment (X), or there is a common
causal factor inﬂuencing both variables. If the assignment is carefully ran-
domized, then the latter possibility is ruled out and any violation of the
instrumental inequality (even under conditions of imperfect compliance)
can safely be attributed to some direct inﬂuence of the assignment process
on subjects’ response (e.g., psychological aversion to being treated). Al-
ternatively, if one can rule out any direct eﬀects of Z on Y , say through
21The inequality is sharp in the sense that every distribution P(x,y,z) satisfying Equa-
tion (3.25) can be generated by the model deﬁned in Figure 5(a).Statistics and Causal Inference 131
eﬀective use of a placebo, then any observed violation of the instrumental
inequality can safely be attributed to spurious dependence between Z and
V , namely, to selection bias.
The instrumental inequality (3.25) can be tightened appreciably if we
are willing to make additional assumptions about subjects’ behavior—for
example, that increasing recommended dosage Z would induce no individ-
ual to decrease the actual dosage X or, mathematically, that for all v we
have
fX(z1,v) ≥ fX(z2,v),
whenever z1 ≥ z2. In the binary case, such an assumption amounts to
having no contrarians in the population, namely, no individual who would
consistently act contrary to his or her assignment. Under this assump-
tion, which Imbens and Angrist (1994)call monotonicity, the inequalities in
Equation (3.26) can be tightened (Balke and Pearl, 1997) to give
P(y,X = 1|Z = 1) ≥ P(y,X = 1|Z = 0)
P(y,X = 0|Z = 0) ≥ P(y,X = 0|Z = 1) (3.27)
for all y ∈ {0,1}. Violation of these inequalities now means either selection
bias or a direct eﬀect of Z on Y or the presence of contrarian subjects.
It is also interesting to note that the analysis of noncompliance pre-
sented in this section is valid under more general conditions than those
shown in the graph of Figure 5(a). If an arrow from Y to X is added to
the graph, a cyclic graph containing the feedback loop X → Y → X is
obtained. Such a loop may represent, for example, patients deciding on
dosage X by continuously monitoring their response Y . Nonetheless, the
structural equation model will not change, because, under the assumption
that the process is at equilibrium, y is a unique function of x and u, and
an equation of the form
x = g(z,y,v) (3.28)
can be replaced with
x = g0(z,v0), (3.29)
such that v0 is still independent of z. The nonparametric nature of the
structural equations in Equation (3.5) permits us to make such transfor-
mations without aﬀecting the results of the analysis. Consequently, testable
implications and nonparametric bounds obtained from the analysis of the
acyclic model are still valid for the cyclic case.132 J. Pearl
4 The language of potential outcomes and counterfactuals
The primitive object of analysis in the potential-outcome framework is the
unit-based response variable, denoted Yx(u), read: “the value that Y would
obtain in unit u, had X been x” (Neyman, 1923; Rubin, 1974). In Section
3.3 we saw that this counterfactual entity has the natural interpretation
as representing the solution for Y in a modiﬁed system of equation, where
unit is interpreted a vector u of background factors that characterize an ex-
perimental unit. Each structural equation model thus provides a compact
representation for a huge number of counterfactual claims. The potential
outcome framework lacks such compact representation. In the potential
outcome framework, Yx(u) is taken as primitive, that is, an undeﬁned quan-
tity in terms of which other quantities are deﬁned. Thus, the structural
interpretation of Yx(u) can be regarded as the formal basis for the potential
outcome approach. In particular, this interpretation forms a connection be-
tween the opaque English phrase “the value that Y would obtain in unit
u, had X been x” and a mathematical model that simulates hypothetical
changes in X. The formation of the submodel Mx explicates mathemati-
cally how the hypothetical condition “had X been x” could be realized, by
pointing to and replacing the equation that is violated in making X = x a
reality. The logical consequence of such hypothetical conditions can then
be derived mathematically.
4.1 Formulating assumptions
The distinct characteristic of the potential outcome approach is that, al-
though investigators must think and communicate in terms of undeﬁned,
hypothetical quantities such as Yx(u), the analysis itself is conducted al-
most entirely within the axiomatic framework of the probability theory.
This is accomplished, by postulating a “super” probability function on
both hypothetical and real events. If U is treated as a random variable
then the value of the counterfactual Yx(u) becomes a random variable as
well, denoted as Yx. The potential-outcome analysis proceeds by treating
the observed distribution P(x1,...,xn) as the marginal distribution of an
augmented probability function P∗ deﬁned over both observed and coun-
terfactual variables. Queries about causal eﬀects (written P(y|do(x)) in
the structural analysis) are phrased as queries about the marginal distri-
bution of the counterfactual variable of interest, written P∗(Yx = y). TheStatistics and Causal Inference 133
new hypothetical entities Yx are treated as ordinary random variables; for
example, they are assumed to obey the axioms of probability calculus, the
laws of conditioning, and the axioms of conditional independence. More-
over, these hypothetical entities are not entirely whimsy, but are assumed
to be connected to observed variables via consistency constraints Robins
(1986) such as
X = x =⇒ Yx = Y, (4.1)
which states that, for every u, if the actual value of X turns out to be x,
then the value that Y would take on if X were x is equal to the actual
value of Y . For example, a person who chose treatment x and recovered,
would also have recovered if given treatment x by design.
The main conceptual diﬀerence between the two approaches is that,
whereas the structural approach views the intervention do(x) as an oper-
ation that changes the distribution but keeps the variables the same, the
potential-outcome approach views the variable Y under do(x) to be a dif-
ferent variable, Yx, loosely connected to Y through relations such as (4.1).
Pearl (2000, Chapter 7) shows, using the structural interpretation of
Yx(u), that it is indeed legitimate to treat counterfactuals as jointly dis-
tributed random variables in all respects, that consistency constraints like
(4.1) are automatically satisﬁed in the structural interpretation and, more-
over, that investigators need not be concerned about any additional con-
straints except the following two:
Yyz = y for all y and z (4.2)
Xz = x ⇒ Yxz = Yz for all x and z. (4.3)
Equation (4.2) ensures that the interventions do(Y = y) results in the
condition Y = y, regardless of concurrent interventions, say do(Z = z),
that are applied to variables other than Y . Equation (4.3) generalizes (4.1)
to cases where Z is held ﬁxed, at z.
To communicate substantive causal knowledge, the potential-outcome
analyst must express causal assumptions as constraints on P∗, usually in the
form of conditional independence assertions involving counterfactual vari-
ables. For instance, in our example of a randomized clinical trial with im-
perfect compliance (Figure 5(a)), to communicate the understanding that
the treatment assignment (Z) is randomized (hence independent of both
the way subjects react to treatments and how subjects comply with the134 J. Pearl
assignment), the potential-outcome analyst would use the independence
constraint Z⊥ ⊥{Xz,Yx}22 . To further formulate the understanding that Z
does not aﬀect Y directly, except through X, the analyst would write a, so
called, “exclusion restriction” Yxz = Yx.
4.2 Performing inferences
A collection of constraints of this type might sometimes be suﬃcient to
permit a unique solution to the query of interest; in other cases, only bounds
on the solution can be obtained. For example, if one can plausibly assume
that a set Z of covariates satisﬁes the conditional independence
Yx⊥ ⊥X|Z (4.4)
(an assumption that was termed “conditional ignorability” by Rosenbaum
and Rubin (1983) then the causal eﬀect P∗(Yx = y) can readily be evaluated
to yield
P∗(Yx = y) =
X
z
P∗(Yx = y|z)P(z)
(using (4.4))
=
X
z
P∗(Yx = y|x,z)P(z)
(using (4.1))
=
X
z
P∗(Y = y|x,z)P(z)
=
X
z
P(y|x,z)P(z). (4.5)
The last expression contains no counterfactual quantities (thus permit-
ting us to drop the asterisk from P∗) and coincides precisely with the
standard covariate-adjustment formula of Equation (3.18).
We see that the assumption of conditional ignorability (4.4) qualiﬁes Z
as a suﬃcient covariate for adjustment, and is equivalent therefore to the
graphical criterion (called “back door” in Section 3.2) that qualiﬁes such
covariates by tracing paths in the causal diagram.
22The notation Y ⊥ ⊥X|Z stands for the conditional independence relationship P(Y =
y,X = x|Z = z) = P(Y = y|Z = z)P(X = x|Z = z), Dawid (1979).Statistics and Causal Inference 135
The derivation above may explain why the potential outcome approach
appeals to mathematical statisticians; instead of constructing new vocabu-
lary (e.g., arrows), new operators (do(x)) and new logic for causal analysis,
almost all mathematical operations in this framework are conducted within
the safe conﬁnes of probability calculus. Save for an occasional application
of rule (4.3) or (4.1), the analyst may forget that Yx stands for a counter-
factual quantity—it is treated as any other random variable, and the entire
derivation follows the course of routine probability exercises.
However, this mathematical convenience often comes at the expense
of conceptual clarity, especially at a stage where causal assumptions need
be formulated. The reader may appreciate this aspect by attempting to
judge whether the assumption of conditional ignorability Equation (4.4),
the key to the derivation of Equation (4.5), holds in any familiar situa-
tion, say in the experimental setup of Figure 5(a). This assumption reads:
“the value that Y would obtain had X been x, is independent of X, given
Z”. Paraphrased in experimental metaphors, and applied to variable V ,
this assumption reads: The way an individual with attributes V would
react to treatment X = x is independent of the treatment actually re-
ceived by that individual. Such assumptions of conditional independence
among counterfactual variables are not straightforward to comprehend or
ascertain, for they are cast in a language far removed from ordinary under-
standing of cause and eﬀect. When counterfactual variables are not viewed
as byproducts of a deeper, process-based model, it is also hard to ascer-
tain whether all relevant counterfactual independence judgments have been
articulated, whether the judgments articulated are redundant, or whether
those judgments are self-consistent. The need to express, defend, and man-
age formidable counterfactual relationships of this type explain the slow
acceptance of causal analysis among epidemiologists and statisticians, and
why economists and social scientists continue to use structural equation
models instead of the potential-outcome alternatives advocated in Angrist
et al. (1996); Holland (1988); Sobel (1998).
On the other hand, the algebraic machinery oﬀered by the potential-
outcome notation, once a problem is properly formalized, can be extremely
powerful in reﬁning assumptions (Angrist et al., 1996), deriving consistent
estimands (Robins, 1986), bounding probabilities of necessary and suﬃcient
causation (Tian and Pearl, 2000), and combining data from experimental
and nonexperimental studies (Pearl, 2000). The Section (4.3) presents a
way of combining the best features of the two approaches. It is based on136 J. Pearl
encoding causal assumptions in the language of diagrams, translating these
assumptions into potential outcome notation, performing the mathematics
in the algebraic language of counterfactuals and, ﬁnally, interpreting the
result in plain causal language.
4.3 Combining graphs and algebra
The formulation of causal assumptions using graphs was discussed in Sec-
tion 3. In this subsection we will systematize the translation of these as-
sumptions from graphs to counterfactual notation.
Structural equation models embody causal information in both the
equations and the probability function P(u) assigned to the error vari-
ables; the former is encoded as missing arrows in the diagrams the latter as
missing (double arrows) dashed arcs. Each parent-child family (PAi,Xi)
in a causal diagram G corresponds to an equation in the model M. Hence,
missing arrows encode exclusion assumptions, that is, claims that adding
excluded variables to an equation will not change the outcome of the hy-
pothetical experiment described by that equation. Missing dashed arcs
encode independencies among error terms in two or more equations. For
example, the absence of dashed arcs between a node Y and a set of nodes
{Z1,...,Zk} implies that the corresponding background variables, UY and
{UZ1,...,UZk}, are independent in P(u).
These assumptions can be translated into the potential-outcome nota-
tion using two simple rules (Pearl, 1995a, p. 704); the ﬁrst interprets the
missing arrows in the graph, the second, the missing dashed arcs.
1. Exclusion restrictions: For every variable Y having parents PAY and
for every set of endogenous variables S disjoint of PAY , we have
YpaY = YpaY ,s. (4.6)
2. Independence restrictions: Let Z1,...,Zk be any set of nodes not con-
nected to Y via dashed arcs, and let PA1,...,PAk be their respective
sets of parents. We have
YpaY ⊥ ⊥{Z1 pa1,...,Zk pak}. (4.7)
The exclusion restrictions expresses the fact that each parent set in-
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Y , determines the value of Y uniquely, and intervention on any other set
S of (endogenous) variables can no longer aﬀect Y . The independence re-
striction translates the independence between UY and {UZ1,...,UZk} into
independence between the corresponding potential-outcome variables. This
follows from the observation that, once we set their parents, the variables
in {Y,Z1,...,Zk} stand in functional relationships to the U terms in their
corresponding equations.
As an example, the model shown in Figure 5(a) displays the following
parent sets
PAZ = {∅}, PAX = {Z}, PAY = {X}. (4.8)
Consequently, the exclusion restrictions translate into
Xz = Xyz
Zy = Zxy = Zx = Z (4.9)
Yx = Yxz.
The absence of any dashed arc between Z and {Y,X} translates into
the independence restriction
Z⊥ ⊥{Yx,Xz}. (4.10)
This is precisely the condition of randomization; Z is independent of all
its non-descendants, namely independent of U and V which are the exoge-
nous parents of Y and X, respectively. (Recall that the exogenous parents
of any variable, say Y , may be replaced by the counterfactual variable
YpaY , because holding PAY constant renders Y a deterministic function of
its exogenous parent UY .)
The role of graphs is not ended with the formulation of causal assump-
tions. Throughout an algebraic derivation, like the one shown in Equation
(4.5), the analyst may need to employ additional assumptions that are en-
tailed by the original exclusion and independence assumptions, yet are not
shown explicitly in their respective algebraic expressions. For example, it is
hardly straightforward to show that the assumptions of Equations (4.9) and
(4.10) imply the conditional independence (Yx⊥ ⊥Z|{Xz,X}) but do not im-
ply the conditional independence (Yx⊥ ⊥Z|X). These are not easily derived
by algebraic means alone. Such implications can, however, easily be tested
in the graph of Figure 5(a) using the graphical criterion for conditional138 J. Pearl
independence, called d-separation (see Greenland et al., 1999a; Pearl, 2000,
pp. 16–17, 213–215). Thus, when the need arises to employ independencies
in the course of a derivation, the graph may assist the procedure by vividly
displaying the independencies that logically follow from our assumptions.
5 Conclusions
Statistics is strong in devising ways of describing data and inferring dis-
tributional parameters from sample. Causal inference require two addition
ingredients: a science-friendly language for articulating causal knowledge,
and a mathematical machinery for processing that knowledge, combining
it with data and drawing new causal conclusions about a phenomena. This
paper introduces nonparametric structural equations models as a formal
and meaningful language for formulating causal assumptions, and for ex-
plicating many concepts used in scientiﬁc discourse. These include: ran-
domization, intervention, direct and indirect eﬀects, confounding, counter-
factuals, and attribution. The algebraic component of the structural lan-
guage coincides with the potential-outcome framework, and its graphical
component embraces Wright’s method of path diagrams. When uniﬁed and
synthesized, the two components oﬀer statistical investigators a powerful
methodology for empirical research.
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Introduction: Can we measure the causal eﬀect of discrimi-
nation?
In his excellent review of recent statistical approaches to causal inference,
Pearl proposes the following causal question motivating research in the
social sciences: “Whether data can prove an employer guilty of hiring dis-
crimination?” Here, we explore whether one can in fact apply Pearl’s causal
inference tools in the context of discrimination. Our main concern relates
to one expressed by Freedman (2003), namely the extent to which we can
engage in causal inference when the “treatment” variables of interest are
concomitants such as gender, race and age, which are not manipulable.
We examine the causal meaning of discrimination and use both the causal
framework and the explicit formulation of counterfactuals that are of inter-
est to the study of discrimination.
What is discrimination?
Discrimination is usually taken to mean the diﬀerential treatment of in-
dividuals based on a perceived characteristic or group membership. In
the United States and elsewhere, there is often a legal deﬁnition of dis-
crimination that is of relevance to our discussion: An action is said to be
discriminatory, e.g., with respect to race, if the treatment of an individual
would be diﬀerent had that person been of a diﬀerent race. Thus, in the
context of employment, we might wish to say that an employer’s actions
are discriminatory if he/she treats employees or applicants for positions dif-
ferently “because of” their race. But race itself is not the “cause” of labor140 S. E. Fienberg and A. M. Haviland
market discrimination, nor is it the cause of diﬀerences in access to educa-
tion, family wealth, or health outcomes. The same could be said of gender
and of age (if we exclude the possibility of sex change operations). Unlike
age, but similarly to gender, race is a characteristic of a person that is both
a social construct and may have some distinctive physical attributes, e.g.,
related to skin color. At this level race is not a manipulable variable. In
Pearl’s notation, we cannot set do(X = x) where X is race. This is the
Freedman (2003) argument referred to above.
The issue of manipulability is less clear if one considers race to be purely
a social construct because then at least theoretically it could be manipu-
lated; however, we can manipulate and even randomize the “perception”
of race. For example, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) used real job
resumes but randomly assigned distinctively African American or white
names to the resumes. (An unknown here is whether names that are dis-
tinctively black or white carry other connotations beyond those associated
with only race, such as class.) Similar ideas have been used in psychology
experiments, e.g., where researchers randomly assign pictures of people of
diﬀerent races as treatment eﬀects to elicit subjects’ responses in diﬀerent
settings.
There are also situations where we can manipulate information about
concomitant variables without randomization. For example, Goldin and
Rouse (2000) consider how information about the gender of applicants to
symphony orchestras was removed through the creation of blind auditions.
In this case gender was not randomized but the information about it became
unavailable. Thus it was possible to obtain data on the eﬀect of having the
information versus not having it on the proportions of women and men who
were hired or promoted. But then we must focus our attention on knowledge
of the hiring process, so that we can eliminate alternative explanations for
the eﬀect of information on gender. Goldin and Rouse (2000) attempted to
do this through various forms of generalized linear models, although there
is some issue about the extent to which they succeeded.
To summarize, even if we cannot manipulate concomitant variables,
there are situations where we can randomize the perception of the con-
comitant variables or we can assess the eﬀect of a shift from having the
information available to not having it available. In these cases, we are
manipulating perception of race or gender. In our ﬁrst example, the ma-
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identiﬁable name to a resume. In the second, the manipulation is the
access to information about gender, the “do command” creates an envi-
ronment in which discrimination based on gender is not possible because
the information is unavailable. This case is closer to the counterfactual we
are most interested in exploring in the context of labor markets, i.e., the
expected outcome (e.g., with regard to hiring or wages) if there were no
labor market discrimination.
Counterfactuals at work
An example of the counterfactuals of interest in labor market discrimination
is the wages of individuals and groups without discrimination. However,
when the question is one of attribution, i.e., the existence of labor mar-
ket discrimination or the mechanism under which it operates, we clearly
cannot observe these counterfactuals. Thus we ask: What is the causal
relationship among race, labor market discrimination, and wages? As we
mentioned above, race certainly does not cause labor market discrimina-
tion. And labor market discrimination does not cause race, although this
idea does correspond with the notion that race and gender as social con-
structs only have meaning through their consequences. Perhaps it can be
thought of as an interaction eﬀect-discrimination acts on race (or gender).
Due to the lack of direct data on discrimination, instead of using discrim-
ination in statistical models, we use race (or gender) with the idea that
if there were no labor market discrimination then we would expect people
with similar productivity to earn equal wages. Thus, in the absence of dis-
crimination, and with complete information on productivity, race should
not be associated with wages. The problem with implementing this logic
is that we do not have complete information on productivity and thus we
cannot discern whether an observed association between race and wages is
due to unobserved diﬀerences in productivity or is evidence of labor market
discrimination. Conversely, suppose an association between race and wages
is not observed once productivity variables are controlled for. This again
could be due to unobserved diﬀerences in productivity (in the opposite
direction), or it could be evidence of a lack of labor market discrimination.142 S. E. Fienberg and A. M. Haviland
Using the potential outcome notation for discrimination
Pearl suggests that we use the notion of potential outcomes in the absence
of a potential experiment in order to attribute a cause to an eﬀect. In the
context of discrimination, we observe that race (or sex) is associated with
wages, and we would like to determine how much of this diﬀerence by race
can be attributed to labor market discrimination. This has been the focus
of an extended research eﬀort in the economics literature on discrimination,
mainly involving the functional forms used to assign these attributions.
Suppose, as in Haviland (2003), our goal is to assess how much of the ob-
served wage diﬀerence between demographic groups, highly educated mem-
bers of diﬀerent racial and ethnic groups, is attributable to discrimination
based on demographic group membership after adjusting for diﬀerences in
qualiﬁcations. Let the unadjusted wage gap be deﬁned by the diﬀerence in
conditional expected values,
Γ(Gj) = E(y1|Gj = 1) − E(y0|Gj = 0), (1)
where y1 and y0 are the natural logarithm of wages as though one is treated
as a member of the demographic group of interest or the base comparison
group respectively, Gj = 1 indicates that respondents are a member of
the demographic group j (black, Hispanic, or Asian men), Gj = 0 indi-
cates that respondents are a members of the base comparison group (non-
Hispanic white men), and Γ(Gj) is the wage gap for group Gj. Besides
demographic group membership, however, there are other characteristics
that aﬀect wages and whose distributions diﬀer between the groups. In
attempting to isolate the eﬀect of market discrimination, the goal is to
control for pre-market characteristics in the estimates of the wage gap and
decompose the total wage gap into an amount associated with diﬀerences
in these characteristics and the amount remaining. Ideally, we would have
wages for each person, with his own characteristics besides group member-
ship, as though he were a white male and as though he were a member of
his own demographic group. (Similarly, we would want to have wages for
each white male as he would be paid were he a member of each other demo-
graphic group.) It is these missing counterfactuals that we need to estimate
in order to obtain an estimate of the average wage gap not associated with
diﬀerences in the distributions of the covariates.
Researchers have focused on obtaining a suﬃcient set of confounders to
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literature refers to this as the strong ignorability criterion: given the set
of covariates, group membership is independent of y0 (Heckman et al.,
1998). Note that there are several versions of this condition depending on
functional form and methodology (this form is speciﬁc to estimating just the
eﬀect of ‘treatment on the treated’ and so refers only to y0). We can address
this type of assumption well by using Pearl’s suggested path diagrams.
If we assume that we have obtained such a set, then we can decompose
the unadjusted gap into a portion that is associated with diﬀerences in
the distributions of the observed covariates and a portion that either is
associated with diﬀerences in the returns to these covariates or that is not
associated with the covariates.
A consequence of the assumption of strong ignorability of group assign-
ment given the covariates stated previously is that E(y0|Gj = 1,X = x) =
E(y0|Gj = 0,X = x). This assumption, in combination with the rest, al-
lows us to consistently estimate the decomposition of the unadjusted wage
gap into explainable and unexplainable portions. To demonstrate, let the
overall average wages in group Gj be expressed as
E(y1|Gj = 1) =
X
X
pjxE(y1|Gj = 1,X = x), (2)
where E(y1|Gj = 1,X = x) is the expected earnings in group Gj with
characteristic X = x, and pjx is the proportion of members of group Gj
with characteristic X = x. We can consistently estimate these values using
standard data sources and estimation techniques. Similarly, for white men
we can write
E(y0|Gj = 0) =
X
X
pWxE(y0|Gj = 0,X = x). (3)
Substituting equations (2) and (3) into equation (1) yields
E(y1|G − j = 1) − E(y0|G − j = 0)
=
X
X
pjxE(y1|Gj = 1,X = x) −
X
X
pWxE(y0|Gj = 0,X = x)
=
X
X
pjx [E(y1|Gj = 1,X = x) − E(y0|Gj = 0,X = x)]
−
X
X
[pWx − pjx]E(y0|Gj = 0,X = x). (4)144 S. E. Fienberg and A. M. Haviland
Our strong ignorability assumption allows us to use equation (4), which
may be observed, to estimate
E(y1|G − j = 1) − E(y0|G − j = 0)
=
X
X
pjx [E(y1|Gj = 1,X = x) − E(y0|Gj = 1,X = x)]
−
X
X
[pWx − pjx]E(y0|Gj = 0,X = x), (5)
where the second summation gives the portion of the unadjusted gap as-
sociated with diﬀerences in the distribution of confounders, and the ﬁrst is
the portion associated with unexplained diﬀerences in the returns to these
confounders.
These models are typically estimated parametrically, with separate lin-
ear regressions for each racial group (or each sex). In this framework the
expected values are regression coeﬃcients, and what is referred to in the
example above as the probability of having a particular characteristic is
replaced by the mean of the characteristic in each group. Three problems
with these parametric models have been noted in the literature. First, there
is often a substantial lack of support in the data to make comparisons over
large portions of the union of the domains of the data for the groups of in-
terest. This problem may be exacerbated by the second problem, which is
incorrect functional form. The ﬁnal, related problem is that the parametric
version of the decomposition (referred to as the Blinder-Oaxaca model and
traditionally used in studies of gender, racial, and ethnic wage gaps, e.g.,
see the review by Altonji and Blank (1999)) makes diﬀerent predictions
depending on whether the coeﬃcients from the regression on the control
group, the group of interest, or a pooled group are used to decompose the
unadjusted gap. These points and their potentially substantial eﬀects on
estimates are demonstrated in Barsky et al. (2002).
One nonparametric alternative, matching, provides an intuitively clear
method for estimating the missing counterfactuals while avoiding the pit-
falls of parametric models in this context. To estimate the missing counter-
factual for a 32-year-old Hispanic man with a master’s degree in business
administration, i.e., his expected wage if he were paid as a white male,
Haviland (2003) uses the mean of the wages of white men of the same age
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can be estimated for each member of the demographic group, the mean
gap conditional on age and education can be estimated by averaging over
the gaps for each individual in the group of interest. This estimate is often
referred to as the eﬀect of ‘treatment on the treated’ where in this case
‘treatment’ is demographic group membership under the condition of labor
market discrimination. Similarly, Pearl (2001) uses the term ‘natural direct
eﬀect’ to describe the change we would expect in men’s employment if they
were treated as women by employers which is how an “eﬀect of treatment
on the untreated” would be interpreted in this context.
The nonparametric method described above has the additional advan-
tage of making problems of support transparent. In fact, the matching
method of estimating the missing counterfactuals is only consistent if it is
used over the intersection of the supports of both distributions (Heckman
et al., 1998). It also provides an estimate of the full distribution of wage
gaps instead of a single point estimate for the mean.
As Pearl discusses, the fact that there are diﬃculties with the paramet-
ric models here has consequences for attributing causal eﬀects. He suggests
that assigning attribution is only possible with parametric models where the
form of a speciﬁc eﬀect of a variable or set of variables is considered known
and thus can be applied outside the range of that data. It is clear from the
econometric literature that, even assuming the set of confounders selected
to be in the model is suﬃcient to meet the strong ignorability criterion,
we cannot justify the parametric models. The nonparametric alternatives
require us to make estimates only within the range of the data, and thus
we must make all assumptions for estimating parameters not directly en-
countered in the data explicitly and not in the form of a parametric model.
Indeed, Pearl suggests that with nonparametric models it is not possible to
attribute causes, at least not in the areas where there is no overlap of the
data. This is similar to the problems with propensity score models when
the probability of being in the treated group is zero or one in some range of
the variables that are being controlled for (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983).
In summary, we highlight three sets of problems. First, we have to use
race or gender as a proxy for discrimination because we typically cannot
observe the mechanisms through which labor force discrimination occurs.
To make direct inference about discrimination, we need other information
about the data generating mechanism, e.g., how does labor market discrim-
ination operate to eﬀect wages. Without this information we need other146 S. E. Fienberg and A. M. Haviland
untestable assumptions to carry over from one circumstance to another.
Second, even when our goal is simply to partition observed diﬀerences in
the outcome to known and unknown reasons, there are a host of problems
with what variables to include in the partition. Third, functional forms
(parametric versus nonparametric and the form of the parametric models)
are problematic and aﬀect whether or not we can make causal attributions.
Pearl recommends the use of path diagrams to encode causal assump-
tions and determine the conditions under which causal inference is pos-
sible. Given the preceding discussion, it is unclear how to represent the
labor market discrimination and non-labor market discrimination factors
aﬀecting wages in a causal path diagram. Pearl notes this diﬃculty in
circumstances where an experiment is not possible; this is the case with
discrimination when the observable variable, race, is not manipulable. Un-
der these circumstances the researcher’s goal is to determine a suﬃcient
set of covariates whose distributions diﬀer by race but are not due to labor
market discrimination in order to partition any diﬀerence in outcome by
race. Pearl’s ‘back-door’ criterion, while diﬃcult to apply in detail without
a path diagram, is intuitively unlikely to be met by observational studies
of discrimination because the factors that aﬀect wages and diﬀer by race
but are not aﬀected by market discrimination are diﬃcult or impossible
to measure. On the other hand, these tools may all be used when race is
replaced in the model by the perception of race, which can be manipulated.
Back doors and the resume experiment
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) solved the problems with the ‘back door’
links in a path diagram for discrimination by randomizing a proxy variable
for race. They used real resumes with all personal identiﬁcation removed
and matched these resumes to help-wanted advertisements in Chicago and
Boston. Then they randomized “African American sounding names” and
“white sounding names” to the pairs of resumes matched to each adver-
tisement. This randomization breaks the links between the education and
work experience on the resume (what an employer observes when making a
decision to call back a potential employee for an interview or not) and race.
This is what the typical observational studies cannot ensure: no matter
how many characteristics we attempt to control for, we may not have the
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There are both positive and negative consequences of their focus on a
particular early stage of the employment process. It is unclear how to re-
late the observed experimental outcome (call backs) to more typical labor
market outcomes such as employment or wages. On the other hand, this
focus makes it possible to randomize the perception of race across hypo-
thetical people. In addition, the speciﬁcity makes this experiment similar
to a small-scale case study in that it can get closer to the actual mechanism
by which labor market discrimination occurs, the racial distinctiveness of a
name aﬀects the probability of call backs. Thus it breaks the ties between
the usual host of confounders between race and the indicators of produc-
tivity that potential employers observe, and it comes closer to identifying
the mechanism through which labor market discrimination operates. (This
assumes that having a racially distinctive name does not carry any other
information or connotations besides race itself.) Both the randomization
and the identiﬁcation of a mechanism are important for making a causal
attribution and thus making it possible to make predictions outside the
current situation. For instance, it may be possible to estimate the eﬀect of
particular policy changes such as removing names from resumes before call
back decisions are made or having employment agencies use codes or some
other technique.
Concluding remarks
Pearl’s paper provides us with an excellent review of a number of issues from
the recent literature on causal modeling and the ways that they link to the
literature on counterfactuals and potential outcomes. We have attempted
in our discussion to show the direct relevance of these ideas to an important
policy problem to which Pearl actually refers in his opening paragraph. We
have explained not only why the issue of discrimination is of interest in the
context of causal models but also why it is far more complex than many
authors have hitherto suggested. The tools of causal inference are, we
believe, essential to such a discussion.
David Heckerman
Microsoft Research
Redmond, U.S.A.
Ross Shachter148 D. Heckerman and R. Shachter
Stanford University
Stanford, U.S.A.
We have been working with causal graphical models for over a decade
and believe that many statisticians and engineers would beneﬁt from using
this approach, recognizing the crucial distinction between passive inference
and active intervention. Consequently, we are delighted to see Professor
Pearl summarize his causal framework in this publication.
His framework is quite elegant and builds on seminal works in statis-
tics and decision making. His “do” graph surgery for causal models, for
example, was ﬁrst proposed by Strotz and Wold (1960), and “do” itself is a
classic decision, albeit with some strong but subtle assumptions. Nonethe-
less, as Pearl describes in this contribution, statisticians have been slow to
adopt his work. Pearl gives two possible reasons why this is so. Here, we
oﬀer and address another reason, which we ﬁnd more compelling.
We ﬁrst saw Pearl’s causal framework in 1993. Although the framework
seemed quite promising to us, we were puzzled by the meanings of and
assumptions underlying a critical component of his framework—namely,
the causal model.
Pearl gave (and still gives) a clear deﬁnition of cause-eﬀect in terms
of the do operator (e.g., Pearl, 2000, page 204) and a clear deﬁnition of
the do operator in terms of a given causal model (e.g., Pearl, 2000, page
70). However, his deﬁnition of causal model was (and still is) unclear. For
example, on page 44 of his book, Pearl writes:
Deﬁnition (Causal Structure). A causal structure of a set
of variables V is a directed acyclic graph (DAG) in which each
node corresponds to a distinct element of V , and each link rep-
resents a direct functional relationship among the corresponding
variables.
Deﬁnition (Causal Model). A causal model is a pair
M =< D,ΘD > consisting of a causal structure D and a set
of parameters ΘD compatible with D. The parameters ΘD as-
sign a function xi = fi(pai,ui) to each Xi ∈ V and a probability
measure P(ui) to each ui, where PAi are the parents of Xi in D
and where each Ui is a random disturbance distributed according
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Although it appears to be mathematically precise, we ﬁnd this deﬁ-
nition to be confusing. What is the source or semantics of the “direct
functional relationship among the corresponding variables” and the “ran-
dom disturbances”? What assumptions are we making when building such
a model?
To answer these questions, we developed a foundation for Pearl’s frame-
work based on decision theory—in particular, the work of Savage (1954).
That is, we deﬁned Pearl’s causal model as well as the do operator and
cause and eﬀect in terms of Savage’s primitives (Heckerman and Shachter,
1995). As an additional beneﬁt, we showed how Pearl’s causal model can
be equivalently represented as an inﬂuence diagram—a graphical repre-
sentation of decision making under uncertainty used now for almost three
decades (Miller et al., 1976).
Once we found this path from Savage to Pearl, we became quite com-
fortable with Pearl’s framework and the assumptions necessary to apply it.
Unfortunately, Pearl has downplayed the strong connections between his
work and decision theory as well as the suitability of the inﬂuence diagram
as a representation of causal interactions. On the contrary, we believe that
people who are familiar with decision theory will ﬁnd comfort, as we have,
in these connections. Of course, some statisticians are not familiar with
decision theory and will need to understand new concepts whether study-
ing Pearl’s ideas directly or through an initial study of decision theory. In
such cases, we believe these researchers might come to an appreciation of
Pearl’s work most easily by ﬁrst gaining an understanding of the implicit
decision theory.
So how do we understand Pearl’s work in terms of decision theory?
Consider Savage’s framework, which begins with a description of his primi-
tives act, consequence, and possible state of the world. Savage (1954, pages
13–14) describes and illustrates these concepts as follows:
To say that a decision is to be made is to say that one or
more acts is to be chosen, or decided on. In deciding on an act,
account must be taken of the possible states of the world, and
also of the consequences implicit in each act for each possible
state of the world. A consequence is anything that may happen
to the person.
Consider an example. Your wife has just broken ﬁve good150 D. Heckerman and R. Shachter
state of the act
world break into bowl break into saucer throw away
good egg six-egg omelet six-egg omelet and ﬁve-egg omelet and one
a saucer to wash good egg destroyed
bad egg no omelet and ﬁve ﬁve-egg omelet and ﬁve-egg omelet
good eggs destroyed a saucer to wash
Table 1: An example illustrating acts, possible states of the world, and conse-
quences. (Taken from Savage, 1954.)
eggs into a bowl when you come in and volunteer to ﬁnish mak-
ing the omelet. A sixth egg, which for some reason must either
be used for the omelet or wasted altogether, lies unbroken be-
side the bowl. You must decide what to do with this unbroken
egg. Perhaps it is not too great an oversimpliﬁcation to say that
you must decide among three acts only, namely, to break it into
the bowl containing the other ﬁve, to break it into a saucer for
inspection, or to throw it away without inspection. Depending
on the state of the egg, each of these three acts will have some
consequence of concern to you, say that indicated by Table 1.
There are two points to emphasize. First, like Pearl but with diﬀerent
language, Savage distinguishes between that which we can choose—namely,
acts—and that which we can see—namely, consequences. Second, once we
choose an act, the consequence that occurs is logically determined by the
state of the world. That is, the consequence is a deterministic function of
the act and the state of the world23. Of course, the consequences can be
(and usually are) uncertain, and this uncertainty is captured by uncertainty
in the state of the world.
With this understanding, the relationship between Savage and Pearl
is not diﬃcult to see. The instances of Pearl’s U correspond to Savage’s
states of the world; the instances of Pearl’s V correspond to Savage’s conse-
quences; the instances of Pearl’s do operators correspond to Savage’s acts;
and Pearl’s functional relationships correspond to Savage’s deterministic
mapping from acts and states of the world to consequences. Of course,
23Savage (1954) deﬁnes an act to be “a function attaching a consequence to each state
of the world.” Equivalently, we think of acts and a function mapping acts and states of
the world to consequences as separate entities. This is a common practice in decision
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there are many details left unsaid; and we encourage the reader to explore
them in Heckerman and Shachter (1995).
One important detail worth mentioning is the special nature of the do
operator. Given some variable X, the set of acts corresponding to do(x) can
not be a set that arbitrarily aﬀects X. In particular, do(x) must be a set of
acts that aﬀects X in an “atomic” way—a way that aﬀects only X directly.
For example, if X corresponds to a person’s wealth, the act of giving the
person tax-free money might qualify as a do(x), whereas the act of giving
the person stolen (and marked) money would not, due to its additional
(presumably undesirable) consequences. In Heckerman and Shachter (1995)
we give a precise meaning to the notion of an atomic decision in terms of
Savage’s primitives, and hence deﬁne the do operator in terms of these
primitives.
In summary, we believe Pearl’s framework is not unlike a beautiful
island ﬁlled with delights and riches. As Pearl presents it, however, there
is no boat to the island. At best, one has to swim through perilous waters
to get there. We oﬀer our work as a safe and comfortable transport to his
paradise.
Joseph B. Kadane
Department of Statistics
Carnegie Mellon University,
Pittusburg, U.S.A.
This is an excellent paper that reviews and updates the notable progress
that has been made by the author and others in recent decades in under-
standing and unrevealing the mysteries of causation. I especially commend
the author for his clarity of exposition; I would recommend this paper to
someone wanting a friendly introduction to what has been up to now a
daunting, diﬃcult and fragmented literature.
I am struck by how compatible this work is with the Bayesian perspec-
tive. As presented by Professor Pearl, the most useful representation of
a causative model is graphical; the absence of a link implies an assump-
tion. It may not be obvious to a reader which model to assume. Indeed
a reader may wish to entertain a variety of models, each representing a
possible state of the world. Attaching subjective probabilities to each of
these models, the whole Bayesian machinery can be used to derive not only152 J. B. Kadane
consequences of each model separately, but also posterior probabilities of
the models themselves.
It may be objected that there will be examples in which the data are
not informative about which model obtains, and this can be foretold with
certainty before the data are available or are examined. This is neither
upsetting nor a tragedy, as it also happens in models not involving a causal
issue. What it comes down to is that certain functions of the parameter
vector are not identiﬁed. But even in such a circumstance, a legitimate
posterior results and can be calculated. It is a problem for those who wish
to use improper prior distributions for parameters taking an inﬁnite number
of possible values, but wish to insist on a proper posterior distribution.
However for those with proper prior distributions, lack of identiﬁcation is
not a diﬃcult or serious issue. That even an inﬁnite number of observations
of a particular type will not settle certain questions (i.e., consistency) need
not be disturbing, both because one rarely has such a data set, and because
often we have questions that particular data sets do not and cannot resolve.
(For more about my views on identiﬁcation in a Bayesian framework, see
Kadane, 1975).
How do we deal socially with such situations? For example, what has
happened to R.A.Fisher’s contention that there was no proof that smoking
causes cancer? There still is no such proof, if by proof we mean the con-
duct of an (obviously unethical) experiment in which some persons would
be randomized to smoking and be forced to smoke, while others would be
randomized not to smoke, and would be forced not to. Nonetheless, both
policy makers and the general public have come to the conclusion that
smoking is really bad for people, and cancer is one of the reasons. What
has occurred in the intervening 50 years? Fisher (1957) claimed that per-
haps incipient cancer caused people to smoke or, perhaps more plausibly,
that there was some unobserved variable that led people to be more likely
to smoke, and be more likely to get cancer. Cornﬁeld et al. (1959) chal-
lenge many of the claims made on behalf of various hypotheses that would
exonerate smoking as a cause of lung cancer. They also give an analysis
to show that an unmeasured covariate causing both smoking and cancer
would have to have a relative risk greater than the 8 observed for smoking
to be an exonerating explanation of the data, thus anticipating some of the
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Perhaps there is such a variable, but it is not unreasonable to ask what
it is, and to take the view that, after 50 years, the burden of producing evi-
dence is on those who wish to continue to take Fisher’s side of the argument.
Thus socially our priors have shifted, even without crisp proof.
We owe Professor Pearl our heartfelt thanks for making these funda-
mental issues much easier to understand. Do(read Pearl).
Seraf´ ın Moral
Dpto. de Ciencias de la Computaci´ on
e Inteligencia Artiﬁcial
Universidad de Granada, Spain.
This is an excellent exposition of recent advances in causality by Prof.
Judea Pearl. In the eighties he made very important contributions to prob-
abilistic graphical models and wrote his inﬂuential book (Pearl, 1988) which
has been a source of inspiration and knowledge for so many researchers
around the world. Then, in the nineties he has concentrated in one of
the most elusive and important concepts in scientiﬁc research: causality.
In Bayesian networks causality was always present, but it was only seen
through the induced independence relationships among the involved vari-
ables. Now, Pearl presents an approach to causal inference, which makes
use of previous advances in graphical models. He shows the diﬃculties of
measuring causal relationships using the classical statistics language and
supports its extension in order to clearly specify causal assumptions and
their implications. With it, former diﬃcult and somewhat obscure rea-
sonings can be formalized in a simple and neat way. The importance and
implications of this work will be seen without doubt in the near future.
Personally, I would like to comment two aspects in which causality should
play a more important role.
The ﬁrst one is related with the ﬁeld of learning Bayesian networks.
In the paper, it is claimed that causality can not be discovered from sta-
tistical knowledge, but this is precisely the ultimate objective of learning
the structure of a Bayesian network, though this is done by seeing the
independencies or by optimizing a measure of adjustment of the network
to the data (score). My experience tells me that when there is a causal
mechanism that generates the data, then with usual learning algorithms
and if the sample is large enough, it is possible to discover the original154 S. Moral
structure or an equivalent one. However, when we try to learn from real
data in which there are correlations but not causal relationships relating all
the variables, we obtain networks in which arcs can not be given a causal
interpretation. These are, in general, complex graphs that can be seen as
the basis for approximating a joint probability distribution involving all
the problem variables by means of products of smaller distributions. How-
ever, even if we can not assume ‘a priori’ causal assumptions, procedures
are based in some implications of causality. For example, Bayesian scoring
metrics assume that we have ‘a priori’ distributions about the parameters
which are independent for diﬀerent variables: the parameters for X are
independent of the parameters of Y given X. Can this be maintained if
the errors associated to X and to Y given X are not independent? This
causal interpretation is more evident in procedures using observational and
experimental data at the same time (Cooper and Yoo, 1999), in which the
truncated factorization is used in the score derivation.
The discovering of causal relationships from observational data has been
discussed in learning literature. But I think that we need more research
eﬀort for determining what can we expect when there is not initial causal
relationships in the variables. It really would be useful to have tools to
determine when a learned arc can be given a causal interpretation. Do we
need some type of ‘a priori’ hypothesis?
The second comment is of diﬀerent nature and it is related with the
role of imprecise probability in causal inference. Very often Bayesians claim
that it is always possible to assign initial ‘a priori’ probabilities, so that a
precise probability can be computed for every event of interest. Afterwards,
if these values are updated by a large sample of independent observations,
then the sensitivity to the initial ‘a priori’ values is small. Here, we have an
example in which this is not true. We have situations in which, even if we
have precise probabilities for all the observed variables, then if we want to
measure the strength of causal relationships, we can only determine bounds
for these values. To be able of determining precise values, we should assign
‘a priori’ probabilities for non observable error variables, which would really
looks something diﬃcult for any expert. In the hypothetical case in which
they were asserted, we should be extremely careful about the conclusions
as they can have strong bias due to ‘a priori’ values even if we have a very
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I believe that one important lesson of this paper is that we should be
very clear about initial assumptions. A theory should provide means for
specifying them in a clear an unambiguous language. Then, sound inference
methods should be available to get information about events of interest. I
believe that it is important for a methodology not to hide underlaying hy-
pothesis and not to force to make more assumptions than one is ready to
accept by the available information. In that case, imprecision in probabil-
ities arises in a very natural way, as initial state of knowledge can be too
weak to determine precise values (Walley, 1991).
But there is another aspect in which imprecise probability can play a
role in causality. It is clear that when we have two variables and a joint
probability distribution there is nothing that can help us to discriminate
causality from correlation. But if instead of having and only one probabil-
ity distribution we have several of them, then the situation can be diﬀerent.
Imagine that we have two variables X and Y and that we have two pos-
sible ’a priori’ distributions p1,p2 about X and two possible conditional
distributions of Y given X, q1,q2, in such a way that the possible joint
probability distributions are all the products p1.q1,p1.q2,p2.q1,p2.q2. In
this case, we way that the joint imprecise information about (X,Y ) decom-
pose as a marginal about X and a conditional probability about Y given X.
This does not always happen and it does not imply that we can decompose
the joint information as a marginal about Y and a conditional on X given
Y . The decomposition on a marginal on X and a conditional on Y given
X makes sense when X is a cause of Y with uncorrelated errors. So, with
imprecise probability and with only two variables we have properties that
are not always veriﬁed and that are implied by the existence of a causal
relationship. A more detailed exposition of this idea can be found in Moral
and Cano (2002).
Rejoinder by J. Pearl
I wish to thank the discussants for taking the time to comment on my
paper, and further illuminating the subtle ways in which causality enters
statistical analysis.156 J. Pearl
Professor Kadane makes an important observation that causal analysis
would be fairly compatible with the Bayesian perspective if one is willing to
attach subjective probabilities to several causal models, each representing a
diﬀerent conﬁguration of mechanisms or a diﬀerent vector of causal param-
eters. It should be remembered though that the number of causal models
one normally wishes to entertain would be astronomical and the task of
assigning prior probabilities to the space of causal models would thus be
hindered by a diﬃcult problem of representation. In practice, the problem
is mitigated by assuming parameter independence, namely, that the param-
eters governing one child/parents family are independent of those governing
another family. This leads to Bayesian scoring metrics mentioned by Pro-
fessor Moral who points out correctly, that parameter independence, an
assumption made routinely in Bayesian statistical literature, makes sense
only under speciﬁc causal assumptions. For example, the parameters of the
marginal of X can be assumed independent of the conditional of Y given
X only if X is a cause of Y, but not if Y is a cause of X. This means
that statisticians who use parameter independence in practice tacitly, are
unwittingly making causal assumptions.
The functional, or mechanism-based analysis proposed in my paper ex-
plains the connection between parameter independence and causal direc-
tionality. Indeed, if each child-parent family is associated with a diﬀerent
physical mechanism, in the sense that changes in one mechanism can be
aﬀected independently of those in other mechanisms, it makes sense then
that the parameters governing the conditional probabilities associated with
those families would be independent of one another. No such independence
is expected when the conditional probabilities do not characterize separate
causal mechanisms.
Professor Moral has identiﬁed another area where tacit causal assump-
tions have been at the root of seemingly pure statistical assumptions – the
composition of imprecise probabilities. Again, taking the Cartesian prod-
ucts of probability intervals makes sense under certain causal assumptions
and not under others, and the reason is the same, Cartesian products are
licensed by mechanism independence.
I welcome Fienberg and Haviland’s analysis of the economical eﬀect of
discrimination within the correct framework of counterfactual analysis and
structural models. One should admire econometricians for attempting to
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I am delighted that Heckerman and Shachter (HS) agree with my obser-
vation that statisticians have been way too slow in embracing an analysis
of causation. I do not agree however with their conclusion that statisticians
would do well to approach causation via decision analysis. Quite the con-
trary, by insisting on decision analysis (DA) as a starting point HS exhibit
the same inﬂexibility that has held back statistics for over a century; stu-
dents of causation much break away with the conﬁnes of both associational
analysis and decision analysis.
In Causality, page 110-112, I elaborate at some length on the relation-
ships between DA and structural causal analysis. The weaknesses of the
former lies precisely in Savage broad characterization of an act as a function
between states of the world (the variables in U) and the set of consequences
(the variables in V), without further explication of the internal nature of
that function. Although correct, this characterization is not very informa-
tive; for it does not tell us how the eﬀect of a compound actions can be
derived from the eﬀects of its components. It can be likened to the charac-
terization of arithmetic addition as a function from I R × I R to I R; though
true, it is way too coarse, for it does not account for the axioms of addition
and does not tell us, for example, how addition diﬀers from multiplication,
also a function from I R × I R to I R.
DA assumes the existence of an oracle capable of predicting consistently
the consequence of any act or combination of acts from any state of the
world. Since the number of possible act-combinations is astronomical, it
is inconceivable that human decision makers can make such predictions
without further structure. Causal analysis explains how those predictions
can be obtained from a more manageable set of primitives, structured in
the form of a causal model. Given the set of functions fi in a causal model,
one can readily compute the consequence of any combination of acts, from
any state of the world. These functional relations, which HS brand as
“confusing” are in fact the building blocks on the basis of which Savage’s
oracle operates. Although it is easy to deﬁne these primitive functions in
terms of Savage actions (see Causality page 205) I found this exercise to
be counter productive and unnatural when, in reality, Savage actions are
(judgmentally) computed from those primitive functions.
True, there is no boat to the paradise of causation if one insists on
sailing the perilous waters of statistics. Even the heavy transport plane
oﬀered by HS is circular and risky. There is however a beautiful bridge to158 J. Pearl
that island, friendly, safe and a walking distance away; let us not ignore
the friendly way to redemption.
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